In 2005, there were several other BTK communications discovered. On January 25, 2005 a tip off to KAKE-TV led to the detection of "a suspicious package" on "a dirt road that runs between 69th and 77th Street North," the television station revealed in an article on the BTK serial killer case. The package, which was sent by BTK, contained a Post Toasties cereal box with several items of jewelry were eventually turned over to the FBI. The FBI later confirmed that the package was indeed from the Wichita serial killer known as BTK.
Earlier in January and again in February a postcard was sent by BTK to the television station. Jeanene Kiesling reported in her KAKE-TV article that the two BTK postcards were similar in layout and directed the reader to the Post Toasties cereal box that was found on January 25th. BTK then sent KAKE-TV another post card, which thanked them for their quick response and also asked them to relate some information to the Wichita Police Department, the report further stated.
Then several weeks later in February, Fox News' KSAS-TV affiliate received a padded manila envelope sent by BTK, which contained a necklace, a letter and another unidentified item inside, Fox 4 News reported. It is believed that the necklace belonged to one of BTK's victims but it is not clear which one. The package, which was BTK's seventh communication, was handed over to the police for analysis.
That same week, Kiesling reported for the first time the entire list of chapters BTK sent to KAKE-TV in May 2004. The chapter list, loosely based on Crime Library's BTK story, was not made public earlier because the police did not want it to hamper the ongoing investigation. According to the article the chapters of BTK's revised Crime Library story were titled as follows:
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Friday, December 25, 2009
malignant 3.mal.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
t is unfortunately a fact of bureaucracy that administrators will inevitably hide whatever makes their agency or company look bad to the public in order to keep the revenue flowing in. The paramount issue with hospitals is trust: If patients don't feel safe going to a particular facility, they'll choose another, and that is to be avoided at all cost.
The fact is, one bad apple doesn't make the entire facility unsafe, but public perception can exaggerate the situation, especially with the media's help. The typical manner of dealing with suspicious caretakers is to move them into jobs where their contact with patients is minimal, or pressure them to leave, but that's just not sufficient to stop them. Numerous physicians and nurses have been protected by administrators, and because of that, their compulsion to harm or kill continues.
In fact, protection by superiors supplies the first motive mentioned on the list below. While there's no one reason why these men and women take advantage of their patients the way they do, most fall into the following categories.
1. Testing feelings of invincibility.
Genene Jones certainly felt protected, and when she added in her ability to generate attention and the fact that she managed to get away with murder for several years, you have a person developing a serious sense of megalomania. She had power over her patients and she seemed to feel she had power over those with whom she worked. She could charm them into siding with her, which left her free to do what she wanted.
2. Attention.
In some cases, nurses who kill are seeking attention, and they may have developed a personality disorder known as Munchausen by proxy syndrome. Often, they return to a healthcare facility many times, making people in their care sick so they can hang out with doctors and get their attention. The more hopeless the case appears, the more they revel in it while feigning concern. They mostly just seek attention and care, although a small percentage of them secretly hope to baffle a physician. If the medical staff at one place suspects fakery, the patient is likely to notice the change in attitudes and move on to another. They may repeat the same scene in each place or come up with new symptoms altogether. Some even inject their charges with a toxin to simulate an organic disease. Most Munchausen by proxy patients are female. They know how to lie in great detail and to disguise what they're doing. What happens to their charges is not their concern; they're in it for the attention. Not all of them are nurses, but some of the nurses in charge of children may have this disorder.
3. Disdain
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire says that the way people treat the objects of their violence speaks to how they feel about people in general, and about themselves. A number of nurses who've been caught exhibit poor self-esteem. While motives attributed to them are often about gaining power over vulnerable people, it may go deeper than that. They may feel so inadequate that harming others or setting up a risky situation is the only way they can place themselves in terms of worth over other people. Their disdain for the patient mirrors their disdain for themselves. This could come from abuse as a child or the failure to be accepted by peers. Whatever the case, they act out what they feel for themselves.
4. Compassion.
Several nurses have claimed that their fatal injection or asphyxiation of patients was done out of a sense of mercy. A 24-year-old nurse in Budapest, "Timea F," who is also known as the Black Angel because she always wears black, is suspected in the deaths of forty patients over the span of a year. The motive she offered in her confession was that she hoped to "ease her terminally ill patients into death." The patients were ill and in pain, with no hope of recovery, and it seemed best to help them. However, "mercy-killing" has often been a cover for some other dark motive, so it's not necessarily to be trusted. Nor is it a justification.
5. Psychopathy
A large percentage of the nurses appeared to show no feelings of remorse for what they had done, or to have any concern about the people they killed. There were no apologies to families of the deceased. In fact, many psychopaths roam free in society, and for those who feel compelled to kill, what better place to do it without discovery than a facility where people die anyway? They're generally good at charming themselves into a position and at hiding what they're up to. It's easy for their colleagues to miss the signs. Many psychopaths are driven by anger and take it out on the most vulnerable people within reach. Some kill just for the physical charge it gives them, which may derive from a depressed autonomic system. About the only way to stop them is better vigilance in the hospital system.
6. The malignant hero
As with doctors, there have been nurses who set up risky situations in order to create an emergency where they can emerge as heroes. It matters little to them that the patients might die, and in fact that's been the case with those who were caught.
7. Financial gain
A few of the caregivers see a way to enrich themselves by conning vulnerable people or stealing from them. Some use a "wallet-opening smile" while others just find a way to take what they can.
Let's take a look at a couple of cases like that.
The fact is, one bad apple doesn't make the entire facility unsafe, but public perception can exaggerate the situation, especially with the media's help. The typical manner of dealing with suspicious caretakers is to move them into jobs where their contact with patients is minimal, or pressure them to leave, but that's just not sufficient to stop them. Numerous physicians and nurses have been protected by administrators, and because of that, their compulsion to harm or kill continues.
In fact, protection by superiors supplies the first motive mentioned on the list below. While there's no one reason why these men and women take advantage of their patients the way they do, most fall into the following categories.
1. Testing feelings of invincibility.
Genene Jones certainly felt protected, and when she added in her ability to generate attention and the fact that she managed to get away with murder for several years, you have a person developing a serious sense of megalomania. She had power over her patients and she seemed to feel she had power over those with whom she worked. She could charm them into siding with her, which left her free to do what she wanted.
2. Attention.
In some cases, nurses who kill are seeking attention, and they may have developed a personality disorder known as Munchausen by proxy syndrome. Often, they return to a healthcare facility many times, making people in their care sick so they can hang out with doctors and get their attention. The more hopeless the case appears, the more they revel in it while feigning concern. They mostly just seek attention and care, although a small percentage of them secretly hope to baffle a physician. If the medical staff at one place suspects fakery, the patient is likely to notice the change in attitudes and move on to another. They may repeat the same scene in each place or come up with new symptoms altogether. Some even inject their charges with a toxin to simulate an organic disease. Most Munchausen by proxy patients are female. They know how to lie in great detail and to disguise what they're doing. What happens to their charges is not their concern; they're in it for the attention. Not all of them are nurses, but some of the nurses in charge of children may have this disorder.
3. Disdain
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire says that the way people treat the objects of their violence speaks to how they feel about people in general, and about themselves. A number of nurses who've been caught exhibit poor self-esteem. While motives attributed to them are often about gaining power over vulnerable people, it may go deeper than that. They may feel so inadequate that harming others or setting up a risky situation is the only way they can place themselves in terms of worth over other people. Their disdain for the patient mirrors their disdain for themselves. This could come from abuse as a child or the failure to be accepted by peers. Whatever the case, they act out what they feel for themselves.
4. Compassion.
Several nurses have claimed that their fatal injection or asphyxiation of patients was done out of a sense of mercy. A 24-year-old nurse in Budapest, "Timea F," who is also known as the Black Angel because she always wears black, is suspected in the deaths of forty patients over the span of a year. The motive she offered in her confession was that she hoped to "ease her terminally ill patients into death." The patients were ill and in pain, with no hope of recovery, and it seemed best to help them. However, "mercy-killing" has often been a cover for some other dark motive, so it's not necessarily to be trusted. Nor is it a justification.
5. Psychopathy
A large percentage of the nurses appeared to show no feelings of remorse for what they had done, or to have any concern about the people they killed. There were no apologies to families of the deceased. In fact, many psychopaths roam free in society, and for those who feel compelled to kill, what better place to do it without discovery than a facility where people die anyway? They're generally good at charming themselves into a position and at hiding what they're up to. It's easy for their colleagues to miss the signs. Many psychopaths are driven by anger and take it out on the most vulnerable people within reach. Some kill just for the physical charge it gives them, which may derive from a depressed autonomic system. About the only way to stop them is better vigilance in the hospital system.
6. The malignant hero
As with doctors, there have been nurses who set up risky situations in order to create an emergency where they can emerge as heroes. It matters little to them that the patients might die, and in fact that's been the case with those who were caught.
7. Financial gain
A few of the caregivers see a way to enrich themselves by conning vulnerable people or stealing from them. Some use a "wallet-opening smile" while others just find a way to take what they can.
Let's take a look at a couple of cases like that.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
angel 55.ang.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
On April 8, 1964, the naked body of 26-year-old Irene Lockwood was found in the Thames, at a spot almost equidistant between the final resting places of Elizabeth Figg and Hannah Tailford. Two naked bodies by the river in a matter of months might be considered an unfortunate coincidence. Three dead girls, added to another near the same spot a few years earlier, could only lead to one conclusion. A killer was on the loose.
Irene Lockwood
Irene Lockwood
The body had been in the water less than 48 hours, but she had evidently been stripped and placed there post-mortem. Once again she had been strangled with some kind of ligature, probably fashioned from her own clothes.
Familiar facts about the dead woman soon emerged. Lockwood was a street girl of only five feet in height (the other three were all 5'2" or under), and like the others, she had suffered from an STD. Like Hannah Tailford and Gwynneth Rees, she was pregnant. She too had been forced to seek illlicit medical assistance for a abortion, and had recently taken pills which she thought were working because they "made her tummy move."
She had been last seen outside a pub in nearby Chiswick on 7th April.
On the face of it, there might have been any number of reasons why someone would want to take this young woman's life. Her friend Vicki Pender had been found battered to death in her North London flat a year previously after having tried to blackmail clients over photographs she took of them, and there's no doubt Lockwood wasn't averse to similar scams. In his recent book on the case, Jack Of Jumps, David Seabrook tells how a favorite trick of Lockwood's was to take clients to a flat where she would insist they take their trousers off outside the room before having sex, at which point two male friends would emerge from a hiding place and go through the unfortunate punter's pockets. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
So she was no angel. But who was, in the world of thieves, pimps and hustlers these women inhabited? Given such an environment, police never knew whether to believe anything they were told by associates of the dead girls — many of them had a lot to hide themselves about their nighttime activities.
That said, even the natural secrecy of vice girls was being eroded by the climate of fear that was spreading across London.
Irene Lockwood
Irene Lockwood
The body had been in the water less than 48 hours, but she had evidently been stripped and placed there post-mortem. Once again she had been strangled with some kind of ligature, probably fashioned from her own clothes.
Familiar facts about the dead woman soon emerged. Lockwood was a street girl of only five feet in height (the other three were all 5'2" or under), and like the others, she had suffered from an STD. Like Hannah Tailford and Gwynneth Rees, she was pregnant. She too had been forced to seek illlicit medical assistance for a abortion, and had recently taken pills which she thought were working because they "made her tummy move."
She had been last seen outside a pub in nearby Chiswick on 7th April.
On the face of it, there might have been any number of reasons why someone would want to take this young woman's life. Her friend Vicki Pender had been found battered to death in her North London flat a year previously after having tried to blackmail clients over photographs she took of them, and there's no doubt Lockwood wasn't averse to similar scams. In his recent book on the case, Jack Of Jumps, David Seabrook tells how a favorite trick of Lockwood's was to take clients to a flat where she would insist they take their trousers off outside the room before having sex, at which point two male friends would emerge from a hiding place and go through the unfortunate punter's pockets. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
So she was no angel. But who was, in the world of thieves, pimps and hustlers these women inhabited? Given such an environment, police never knew whether to believe anything they were told by associates of the dead girls — many of them had a lot to hide themselves about their nighttime activities.
That said, even the natural secrecy of vice girls was being eroded by the climate of fear that was spreading across London.
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Matsuoka-Stahmer conversations 4.uuwo.00200293884 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The United States fully appreciated the steps taken by Japan to meet the difficulties inherent in the different relations of both countries toward the European war and declared that it would be very helpful if the Japanese government would continue to study the question for the purpose of clarifying it still further.
In order to prepare for the proposed meeting of responsible Chiefs of the Japanese and American governments, the United States had endeavored to put into effect a comprehensive program applying liberal and progressive principles uniformly to the entire Pacific area. Apparently, however, the Japanese government desired a program circumscribed by qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those nondiscriminatory principles. Under these circumstances, a meeting between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt could never hope to contribute to the advancement of the purposes which the United States desired.
Nevertheless, the United States welcomed Japan's assurances, accompanying Prime Minister Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, that it advocated the principles supported by the United States as the only sound basis for stable international relations. The United States believed that these fundamental principles must be given renewed consideration before a firm foundation could be laid for a meeting between the two governments.
The statement pointed out that President Roosevelt, still interested in the proposed meeting with Prime Minister Konoye, sincerely hoped that a discussion of the fundamental questions would add to the success of such a meeting. The United States was firmly convinced that by collaborating with Japan in the fundamental rehabilitation of mutual relations, the resulting agreement would contribute to lasting peace throughout the Pacific area, based upon justice, equity and order.[407]
After reading the document, Ambassador Nomura stated that his government would be disappointed that the proposed meeting could not take place. Once more, he assured Secretary Hull of Japan's sincerity in first suggesting that such a meeting be held,[408] but said that in view of internal difficulties, he did not believe that Japan could go further at this time. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Although expressing his own confidence in the sincerity of the Japanese Prime Minister and other officials of that government, Secretary Hull nevertheless pointed out that past actions of Japan made it impossible to remove certain doubts concerning the true aims and principles of Tokyo. For this reason, the Secretary Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire of State had insisted that a definite agreement, incorporating the peaceful policies and courses of both governments, be drawn up.
Ambassador Nomura then referred to a press report made by a member of the American Cabinet, which would undoubtedly have a bad effect on Japan's public opinion. Although admitting that certain persons in Japan had made similar statements which were detrimental to Japanese-American peace negotiations, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that they were members of the Japanese Cabinet. Secretary Hull replied that during the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and members of the American government, Mr. Matsuoka had made statements inconsistent with the spirit prompting these discussions, but Ambassador Nomura had continued the discussion despite them.
Secretary Hull believed that no proposed meeting could be held before a definite agreement in policy had been established, nor could any patchwork arrangement result in a lasting Pacific peace. It was Ambassador Nomura's opinion that the only source of difficulty was Japan's desire to retain troops in China. No dispute was expected over the question of commercial equality.
[407] Ibid.
[408] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.
[92]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Expressing the belief that Japan would benefit from the universal application of the policy of nondiscrimination, Secretary Hull referred to a report of the Lima conference, containing many economic resolutions concerning South America, which the Japanese government might adopt in the Far East.
According to Ambassador Nomura, Japan's present attitude with respect to regional economic blocs, which destroyed the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination, had resulted from measures similar to those taken at Ottawa, Canada. Since he had been fighting the adoption of such commercial policies, Secretary Hull stated that he would like Japan to join the United States in establishing liberal economic policies. At the conclusion of the conference, Ambassador Nomura again assured Secretary Hull that the Konoye Cabinet was in a comparatively strong position and it desired to reach an agreement with the United States.[409]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
Calling on Secretary Hull at his invitation at 9:00 A.M. on October 2, 1941, Ambassador Nomura received the reply of the United States to the Japanese proposals.[410] Secretary Hull stated that in the opinion of the United States a conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt would be precarious unless a "clear-cut", not a "patch up", understanding regarding the maintenance of peace throughout the whole Pacific could be arrived at beforehand. Although disappointed by the American reply, Ambassador Nomura promised to transmit the message to his government.[411]
101. Tokyo Reports Receiving America's Reply
On October 3, 1941 Tokyo reported the receipt of the United States' reply to Japan's proposal concerning the leaders' conference.
In view of the domestic situation, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that careful checks be made of newspaper articles dealing with the Japanese-American negotiations, since rumors concerning the fall of the Konoye Cabinet might endanger the success of the negotiations.[412]
102. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 3, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[413]
Ambassador Nomura had called on Secretary Hull at his own request on October 3, 1941 to report among other things that on the preceding day he had transmitted the text of the United States' reply to the Japanese proposals. In turn, Tokyo had informed the Japanese Ambassador that it was preparing a statement for public release.[414] Ambassador Nomura hoped to receive an advance copy to submit to Secretary Hull before its publication. Secretary Hull made no comment.[415]
[409] Ibid.
[410] III, 240.
[411] Ibid.
[412] III, 241.
[413] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.
[414] There is no record of such a definite statement from Tokyo in American files.
[415] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.
[93]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
In order to expedite certain business matters for his government, Ambassador Nomura called upon Secretary Hull on October 3, 1941.[416] The Japanese Naval Ministry desired that arrangements be made to have a courier from Washington go to Hawaii, and the Japanese Foreign Office wished to purchase American oil through the transfer of Japan's unfrozen funds in South America. Although these matters ordinarily came under the cognizance of the Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission, Secretary Hull promised to intercede for the Japanese government.
Ambassador Nomura also mentioned the possibility of Japan's issuing a statement regarding the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, and said that if this were done the United States would be notified. Secretary Hull did not object.[417]
103. Foreign Minister Toyoda Obtains a Copy of British Ambassador Craigie's Report (October 3, 1941)
Since British Ambassador Robert Craigie's vacation trip to the United States had been unavoidably delayed by the sickness of his chief assistant, Foreign Minister Toyoda availed himself of the opportunity to discuss various problems involving the Japanese-American situation with him. The Japanese Foreign Minister also asked Ambassador Grew to discuss current diplomatic relations with the British Ambassador.
As a result of both these meetings, Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that Ambassador Craigie had cabled Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Ambassador Halifax in support of the proposals for an immediate conference between the United States and Japan. However, in view of the secret source of this information, Ambassador Nomura was asked not to disclose it.[418]
Since Ambassador Nomura was furnished with the gist of Ambassador Craigie's report to the British government, several interesting possibilities exist concerning the method by which the Japanese obtained it. Though Ambassador Craigie might have given the report to the Japanese Foreign Office, this seems improbable in view of Foreign Minister Toyoda's use of the phrase "according to absolutely unimpeachable sources", instead of mentioning the British Ambassador, and his instructions to Ambassador Nomura concerning absolute secrecy in the matter.[419]
The report might have been obtained through espionage activities. Another interesting possibility is that the Japanese were reading the British diplomatic codes at this time, though there is no other evidence to indicate their success in this field. However, in the absence of definite information, no decision can be reached as to the source of this intelligence.
According to Ambassador Craigie's report to London, the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had increased the chances for Japan's turning from the Axis powers toward the democracies. The British Ambassador pointed out that if such a change were to benefit Japan it must take place without delay. Since at the present time Japan could enter into nothing more than a temporary understanding, the United States was endangering the ultimate success of the negotiations by arguing over every word and phrase as though it were essential to the conclusion of any preliminary agreement. It was apparent, Ambassador Craigie believed, that the American government did not understand domestic conditions in Japan.[420]
[416] III, 242.
[417] Ibid.
[418] III, 243.
[419] Ibid.
[420] III, 244.
[94]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In spite of the strong opposition within Japan arising from Prince Konoye's reversal of policy, the Japanese Prime Minister retained his desire to avoid the dangers connected with the Tripartite Pact. If this opportunity for the settlement of Far Eastern problems were lost and the leaders' conference failed to materialize, Ambassador Craigie declared that the Konoye Cabinet would be placed in a precarious position.
Though Ambassador Craigie was aware that many other factors were complicating the consideration of negotiations, both he and the American Ambassador in Japan agreed that this favorable opportunity should not be allowed to slip by because of the unduly suspicious attitude of the United States. However, he agreed that until Prime Minister Konoye's principles actually materialized, retaliatory economic pressure against Japan should be continued.[421]
104. Foreign Minister Toyoda Directs Ambassador Nomura to Submit Another Japanese Explanation
On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to indicate to American authorities that since the Japanese attitude regarding certain fundamental points had been explained theoretically to the satisfaction of the United States, the actual opening of negotiations should now be possible.[422] Although there remained three points upon which divergent views were still held, namely: economic activity in the Pacific, the withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese government was certain that the United States had a clear comprehension of the other issues.
Though Prime Minister Konoye approved in principle of the four basic principles underlying the present negotiations, this did not preclude certain differences of opinion regarding their actual application which Prime Minister Konoye desired to consider at the time of the negotiations. The Japanese government had managed its domestic affairs in order to accomplish this, and it wanted Ambassador Nomura to see to it that the United States did not misunderstand the situation.[423]
105. Ambassador Nomura Apologizes for His Hasty Conclusions
During the period of informal negotiations between Japan and the United States, Ambassador Nomura and Foreign Minister Toyoda often disagreed as to policy and principles. On October 4, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, asking that Foreign Minister Toyoda excuse the careless remarks he had sent to Tokyo on the preceding day, explained that his actions had resulted only from the most profound concern for Japan at this critical moment of its history, and that he was deeply impressed with Foreign Minister Toyoda's tremendous efforts since his appointment and throughout the negotiations.[424]
Ambassador Nomura believed that before Japan was able to become self-sufficient as a result of the sphere of co-prosperity, a drastic economic reorganization would have to take place which would be difficult to carry out. Expressing a doubt about a northward advance, the Japanese Ambassador believed that a move to the south might obtain a Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire profitable foothold after several years.[425]
[421] Ibid.
[422] III, 245.
[423] Ibid.
[424] III, 246.
[425] Ibid.
[95]
106. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests an Immediate Reply to His Message of October 4, 1941
Since Foreign Minister Toyoda had not yet received any information from Ambassador Nomura regarding America's attitude toward the points outlined in his message of October 4, 1941,[426] he informed the Japanese Ambassador on October 17, 1941 that the Japanese government was unable to continue its consideration of the United States' memorandum. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister requested that Ambassador Nomura submit a report with the utmost speed.[427]
On the following day Ambassador Nomura's report had not yet been received in Tokyo. Since the internal situation in Japan would not permit further delay, Foreign Minister Toyoda again stated that until he had received the American reply to his telegram, the Japanese government could not continue its discussions concerning the American memorandum. Therefore, he again urged that Ambassador Nomura reply at once.[428]
107. Japanese-American Conversation
Breakfasting with Mr. Eugene Dooman in Tokyo on the morning of October 7, 1941, Mr. Ushiba discussed the precarious position in which Prince Konoye now found himself because the preliminary conversations with the United States had failed to make progress. Since the latest Japanese proposal for reconciliation between the two countries had not been accepted, the opposition in Japan now had an opportunity to criticize the Konoye Cabinet.[429]
Although in its anxiety to end the China Incident the army had given Prince Konoye unqualified support, he would now have to accept responsibility for the present failure. No one else would take a similar risk or would have the political prestige to gain support of the army in settling the China Incident by negotiation.
Pessimism in the army as well as in the other Japanese official circles had greatly increased because of the failure of the American government to state the precise measures it wished Japan to take. In fact, since the receipt of the memorandum of October 2, 1941 from the United States, many in Japanese governmental circles believed that after America had obtained a definite declaration of Japan's policies and objectives, with no intention of formulating any understanding with Tokyo, America felt justified in maintaining an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan because its objectives differed from their own. Refuting this conjecture, Mr. Dooman stated that the memorandum of October 2, 1941 had been a direct result of American public opinion which demanded that there be an agreement on certain fundamental points prior to any formal negotiations.
Nevertheless, Mr. Ushiba insisted that the American memorandum was not only extremely argumentative, preceptive and uncompromising, but it also contained no suggestions calculated toward helping the Japanese government to meet the desires of the United States. At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Ushiba said that the only thing left for Japan to do was to ask the American government to specify exactly the commitments it wished Japan to make, and if a definite reply were not forthcoming, to end the conversations.[430]
[426] III, 245.
[427] III, 247.
[428] III, 248.
[429] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 662-663.
[430] Ibid.
[96]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
108. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 7, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[431]
Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Grew call on the morning of October 7, 1941 to discuss the American memorandum presented to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941. Because the American Embassy had received only a resume of that document, Ambassador Grew declined to make any comments.
Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that not only had he been informed of Ambassador Grew's private meeting with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, but also he knew that Ambassador Grew had communicated Prince Konoye's statements to President Roosevelt through Secretary Hull in "a personal and private message". Since the Prime Minister's statements had been unofficial and merely those of an individual in the Japanese government, it had not been expected that they would be incorporated into a public American document which would be circulated among Japanese officials having no knowledge of Prince Konoye's meetings with Ambassador Grew. However, because Prince Konoye's opinion had been expressed inaccurately in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Japan felt it necessary to clarify the record.
In spite of the fact that the American document had maintained that Prince Konoye fully subscribed to the four points contained in the memorandum of October 2, 1941, actually the Prime Minister had accepted the four point program only "in principle", and had indicated that some adjustment would be required in their application to actual conditions. Ambassador Grew interpolated the comment that there was no doubt as to the accuracy of his report concerning the Japanese Prime Minister's statement. Foreign Minister Toyoda then stated that following the complete examination of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, further comments would be forthcoming. In the meantime, the Japanese Foreign Minister, referring to the unofficial draft statement presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 as well as Prince Konoye's unofficial statement of September 6, 1941, requested that misunderstandings arising from a discussion of such "technical procedure" should be avoided until some real progress had been made.
Foreign Minister Toyoda commented briefly on the United States' desire to revert to the status quo which had prevailed four years ago in the Pacific. Because Japan had been involved in large scale warfare since that time, a return to the situation previously existing would entail basic adjustments in Japan.
When asked for his own private opinion on the position of the United States according to the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew replied that America was endeavoring to ensure that Japan would observe those principles designed to achieve lasting peace in the Pacific area.[432]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[433]
On October 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him to discuss the American reply to the Japanese proposals. Assuming that the American Ambassador had also received a copy of the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired concerning Mr. Grew's opinions on the document. However, since Ambassador Grew had received only a resume of his government's memorandum, he was loath to express an opinion without having read the full text.
[431] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 663-665.
[432] Ibid.
[433] III, 249.
[97]
Certain that this resume contained the most important points of the American memorandum, and would facilitate the forming of an opinion, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Grew cooperate in reaching an understanding by voicing his ideas. Although forced to base his statements on an inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, Ambassador Grew replied that the United States was undoubtedly attempting to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.
Remarking bluntly that the Japanese government was dissatisfied with the American reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the United States did not understand the domestic and external conditions affecting Japan. Assuring the Japanese Foreign Minister that recently he had submitted a fourteen page report on the various changes seen during his many years in Japan, Ambassador Grew said that he had described fully the sincere efforts made by the Japanese government to effect a compromise with America. However, Ambassador Grew did not continue the discussion of this matter.
Foreign Minister Toyoda then discussed certain phrases used in the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941 which did not meet the approval of the Japanese government. Although it stated that Prime Minister Konoye had "fully subscribed" to the four principles laid down by the United States, actually the record of the meeting between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Prime Minister clearly showed that Prince Konoye had agreed to these policies "in principle" only.
When Ambassador Grew insisted that he had reported the discussion accurately to his government because he had been fully aware of the importance of each word spoken, Foreign Minister Toyoda agreed that the matter was important and that his notes clearly recorded an agreement in principle only. In view then of this error the Japanese government took the liberty of changing the term "fully" to "in principle". In order to have the statement coincide with that made in the original discussion, Prime Minister Toyoda ordered that this correction be made in the copies of the American memorandum sent to Ambassador Nomura and other authorized persons for their perusal. Ambassador Grew thanked the Japanese Foreign Minister for reporting this discrepancy to him.
After explaining that he had no desire to become too argumentative, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked by what authority the United States had quoted a passage from Prime Minister Konoye's private message to President Roosevelt in an official American document. Agreeing with Foreign Minister Toyoda wholeheartedly, Ambassador Grew stated that the error must have been due to faulty handling of the papers in the State Department. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, Ambassador Grew seemed to recall that it was Ambassador Nomura who had accepted the four principles unconditionally.
Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if this misunderstanding had been caused by careless handling of certain papers by Japanese representatives, it would be necessary to make amends at a future date, since any action taken now would involve the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. Since Ambassador Nomura himself had caused a misunderstanding by submitting a personal note on September 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed it advisable to do nothing further at the present time.[434]
109. Mr. Terasaki Interviews Ambassador Grew[435]
On the day following Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with the American Ambassador, Mr. Terasaki requested Ambassador Grew to discuss from an entirely personal and unofficial standpoint the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[436]
[434] Ibid.
[435] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 8, 1941, S.D., II, 666-667.
[436] Ibid.
[98]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The American Ambassador said the memorandum, friendly in tone and helpful in substance, indicated the desire of the United States to make progress in the conversations. When asked by Mr. Terasaki what actions the United States wished Japan to take in order to reach a mutual agreement, Ambassador Grew replied that three major points which had caught his eye were: (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) the application to the entire Pacific area of certain Japanese assurances which appeared limited to the southwest Pacific; and (3) Japanese claims for special privileges in China as a result of geographical propinquity to that country.
Pointing out that many prominent Japanese officials were comparing the Monroe Doctrine and the United States' relationship to Latin American countries with Japan's position in the Far East, Ambassador Grew emphasized that the two situations were not at all analogous. Since the American Ambassador and Mr. Terasaki could not agree on this point it was not pursued further.
Turning to America's desire for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from both China and French Indo-China, Mr. Terasaki asked if Japan must take action before a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye took place. Explaining that he was not in a position to interpret the State Department's phraseology, Ambassador Grew nevertheless expressed his private opinion that in view of previous failures of Japan to live up to its promises his government desired to see concrete evidence of Japan's "manifest intentions" to withdraw its forces from occupied territories.
Ambassador Grew then reminded Mr. Terasaki that Secretary Hull desired that informal discussions relating to both Japanese and American proposals be held in Washington. Though Mr. Terasaki expressed surprise at this, Ambassador Grew said that he had conveyed this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda. If Japan were uncertain regarding any portion of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew suggested that Ambassador Nomura seek an interview with Secretary Hull.
Because Mr. Terasaki referred during the conversation to America's suggestion that Japan declare publicly its intention to withdraw its troops from China and French Indo-China, Ambassador Grew was certain that Japan thoroughly understood this point.[437]
110. Tokyo Explains Background of Japanese-American Negotiations to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
In a message to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on October 8, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda summarized the background of the current Japanese negotiations with America. The Japanese-American informal conversations had been inaugurated during the administration of the second Konoye Cabinet, but a rupture had occurred when Japan felt it necessary to penetrate into French Indo-China in order to hasten the end of the China Incident, break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense, and procure essential materials. Although its action had been motivated solely by self defense, according to Japan, England and the United States had imposed an economic blockade upon Japan with the result that diplomatic relations had deteriorated and the internal situation existing in Japan had become extremely critical.[438]
When the war between Germany and Russia had become a protracted struggle, contrary to German expectations, the United States and England came to Russia's assistance. Commerce between Europe and Asia had been disrupted, and Japanese liaison with Germany and Italy had been severed.[439]
[437] Ibid.
[438] III, 250.
[439] Ibid.
[99]
Meanwhile, England and the United States had tightened their economic net about Japan, preventing the Japanese government from concluding its war with China. As a result Japan had attempted to negotiate with the United States so that hostilities with the Chinese could be terminated under satisfactory conditions and an era of co-prosperity could be established in East Asia during which time Japan's natural resources could be conserved for the future. By means of diplomatic negotiations Japan had intended to open the way for a compromise with the United States to ensure its own economic stability.
After concluding the Tripartite Pact, Japan had attempted to include Russia in the Japanese-German-Italian Pact, and by using German Ambassador Stahmer in negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow, to effect a solution to any problems in the north. Mr. Ott had also promised to work for an understanding between Japan and Soviet Russia. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Japan also had intended to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy in return for certain mechanical and technical assistance. However, unexpected events had occurred recently and at the present time Japan could conclude the China Incident promptly only by maintaining amicable relations with the United States.[440]
Since Germany as well as Japan recognized the need for preventing the United States from entering the European war, during the Matsuoka-Stahmer conversations, it promised to spare no effort to improve relations between the United States and Japan. In fact, the Tripartite Pact had been intended to establish universal peace by preventing the spread of the European war and restraining the United States from participating in it. Now, however, the European war affected all the countries of Europe; only the Pacific remained untouched. In conformity with the original spirit of the Tripartite Pact, therefore, Japan believed it advisable to investigate the causes of any problems existing between Japan and the United States in order to ensure harmony in the Pacific area.[441]
With this objective in view, Mr. Matsuoka's Cabinet had begun negotiations with Washington, and even after a new Cabinet had come into power, Prime Minister Konoye felt the need for continuing them. At the very moment when Tokyo and Washington had been arguing over the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, Prime Minister Konoye had suggested that a conference between President Roosevelt and himself would establish the foundation for an understanding between the two governments.
Since the time of that proposal, conversations had been held for the purpose of exchanging opinions prior to the major meeting. On October 4, 1941 Japan received the American memorandum concerning the proposal for a leaders' conference which had been forwarded from its Embassy in Washington. The document was now under study by the Japanese Foreign Minister.
Current negotiations diverged in no way from the principles contained in the Tripartite Pact. Japan merely wished to conclude its hostilities with China through a basic treaty by which the United States would coerce the Chiang regime into allowing Japan to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia. To ensure economic stability and peace in the Pacific area Japan desired to prevent the expansion of the European war, and particularly, the United States' participation in it.[442]
[440] III, 251.
[441] III, 252.
[442] III, 253.
[100]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
111. Ambassador Nomura Explains the American Attitude Toward the Japanese Proposals
On October 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised Foreign Minister Toyoda of his personnel opinion regarding the American attitude toward the Japanese proposals.[443] According to the Japanese Ambassador, the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 made it apparent that the United States intended to base any further negotiations with Japan on the four original principles laid down during the first preliminary discussions. Since the United States believed it necessary, before settling the Pacific question, to achieve unanimity on the fundamental questions, previously explored by both nations in their unofficial talks, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American government would not agree to a meeting between the leaders of the two countries until it was clearly determined that the four principles would be applied concretely to the problems of the Pacific area. Dissatisfied because Japan would not discuss these policies in detail, the United States demanded further clarification of Japanese views.[444]
Ambassador Nomura agreed with American officials that in Japan's proposals submitted on September 6, 1941 and in its subsequent explanation Japan had limited the scope of the previous informal conversations and had curtailed the guarantees concerning the aforementioned principles. Japan had not only refused to guarantee wholeheartedly that it would stop armed aggression, but it had limited the extent of commercial nondiscrimination. Using geographic propinquity as an excuse, Japan hoped to secure more favorable economic conditions for itself in China. Therefore, the question of garrisoning Japanese troops in China and French Indo-China remained a major obstacle in the negotiations. Moreover, a clearer explanation of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact was requested by American officials.[445]
Since the United States firmly believed that any disagreement on the four basic principles would prevent the success of future discussions, it wished to obtain unanimity regarding their interpretation and then gradually turn to a discussion of matters relating to them. Because it had been made evident in the United States proposals of June 2, 1941 that the United States intended to retain those four principles as a basis for any negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were being disregarded. Nevertheless, the Japanese Ambassador advised that further discussions be held concerning the China Incident and the discontinuation of American activities designed to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Other matters in the latest Japanese proposal which needed clarification included the stipulation concerning the Nanking Treaty in the clause relating to the China Incident, joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning the Japanese attitude toward the European war, and the question of eliminating the annex to the clause regarding commerce between the United States and Japan.[446]
Ambassador Nomura drew to Foreign Minister Toyoda's attention the fact that, during the conversations in Tokyo, Ambassador Grew had assumed that an understanding had already been reached by Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull on the four basic principles. But on April 16, 1941 when Secretary Hull first presented the four principles to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador had not felt authorized to accept such a proposal before receiving instructions from his government.
[443] III, 254.
[444] III, Ibid.
[445] III, 255.
[446] III, 256.
[101]
Although Ambassador Nomura had been careful not to give the impression that Japan would accept the principles, he nevertheless believed that because of their abstractness they would be applied with some elasticity by the United States. Since discussions of principles in any peace conference were often circumlocutory, Ambassador Nomura did not feel that his government should become particularly troubled over this aspect of the situation.[447]
112. Mr. Terasaki Calls on Mr. Dooman (October 9, 1941)
Although on the preceding day he had received Ambassador Grew's opinion concerning the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Mr. Terasaki called upon Counselor Dooman to receive his personal observations regarding the same document.[448] Since Ambassador Grew had reported his conversation to the American Embassy, Mr. Dooman did not feel that he was in a position to elaborate further on this matter. Nevertheless, Mr. Terasaki insisted on summarizing his discussion with Ambassador Grew, continually emphasizing the American Ambassador's belief that the American memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance.
Since the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China was a major point in the United States' memorandum, Mr. Terasaki asked whether Japan was expected to execute such a move before President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye conferred. Admitting that such an interpretation might be applied, Mr. Dooman pointed out that the American government hesitated to enter any formal negotiations as long as Japanese troops continued to exercise complete control over French Indo-China as though it were a Japanese colony. When Mr. Terasaki expressed ignorance of such a situation existing in French Indo-China, Mr. Dooman referred to the arrest of French and Chinese nationals, the seizure of private property, airfields and military barracks, and threats to seize the Customs.
Mr. Terasaki then turned the conversation to the Japanese formula for the application of equality throughout the southwest Pacific. Mr. Dooman believed that Japan did not intend to confine its policy of nondiscrimination solely to the southwest Pacific, and he did not feel that this issue should constitute any obstacle to peace negotiations. On the other hand, Mr. Terasaki agreed that Japan's explanations of its proposals were open to the very implications which Japan had desired to avoid.
Returning to the problem of recalling Japanese troops from China, Mr. Terasaki attempted to define his government's position by pointing out that Tokyo could not withdraw its forces until an agreement had been reached between Japan and China. As a demonstration of Japan's desire for peace, Mr. Dooman suggested that the Japanese government furnish a time schedule for the withdrawal of the troops or consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese government, with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China.[449]
113. Mr. Dooman Warns Mr. Terasaki Against New Japanese Troop Landings in French Indo-China.
Later that same day, learning that Japan was prepared to land 50,000 additional troops in Tonking, French Indo-China on or about October 15, 1941, Mr. Dooman returned Mr. Terasaki's call to warn him of the serious consequences which might follow such a move.[450] Mr. Dooman then reminded Mr. Terasaki that the situation created by the first Japanese landings in July, 1941 had ended the informal conversations then in progress between the two governments.
[447] III, 257.
[448] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 667-669.
[449] Ibid.
[450] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 669-670.
[102]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Stating that he was unaware of such a plan of the Japanese military force, Mr. Terasaki assured Mr. Dooman that he would immediately convey this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda.
114. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 9, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[451]
After first expressing Japan's appreciation of the American attitude toward the visit of three requisitioned Japanese ships to the United States, Ambassador Nomura referred to the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. Following his recent instructions from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested Secretary Hull to express his reactions to those points entailing a divergence of view between the two governments.
In Ambassador Nomura's opinion there were three main questions to be decided: (1) the relation of Japan and the United States to the European war; (2) the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas of China; and (3) the application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination to the entire Pacific area.
At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull declared that America had been disturbed at the modifications and restrictions which the Japanese proposals imposed upon the broad program originally planned to ensure peace and stability throughout the entire Pacific. Although the principle of nondiscrimination in international trade had been intended to pertain to the entire Pacific area, Japan had greatly limited its practical application. Furthermore, because of its propinquity to China, Japan apparently intended to reserve special privileges for itself in that country.
Secretary Hull suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Japanese Ambassador to clarify the aims of their respective governments. It was then agreed to have this meeting take place later in the afternoon.
Although Prince Konoye had informed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that he personally subscribed in principle to Secretary Hull's four basic points for peace, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that certain problems, particularly in regard to China, remained to be solved. Since chaos would undoubtedly arise from the conflicting policies of the Kuomingtang and the Communistic parties in China, the withdrawal of Japanese troops would endanger Tokyo's commercial enterprises there and place Japan itself in a dangerous position.
Ambassador Nomura did not respond when Secretary Hull asked if the Chinese government would accept the stationing of Japanese troops in its country. Secretary Hull believed that a sufficient number of Chinese troops might be trained to maintain order in their own country. From the United States' experience in Latin America, Secretary Hull continued, the stationing of any troops in a foreign country perpetuated a feeling of ill will. To stress his point further Secretary Hull referred to the situation existing in the United States after the Civil War when northern troops were retained in the southern states.
Ambassador Nomura answered that Japan was now at a political crossroad. Expressing only his own personal opinion, the Japanese Ambassador believed that the majority of the Japanese people supported the renewal of amicable relations with the United States, in spite of agitators within the government who were attempting to disrupt peaceful negotiations. Because war between Japan and the United States would be such a serious undertaking, Ambassador Nomura desired that everything possible be done to avert the possibility of conflict.
[451] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 9, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 670-672.
[103]
In the course of this discussion both Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura exchanged compliments concerning their mutual regard for the other's integrity and frankness of expression.[452]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[453]
Ambassador Nomura reported that in accordance with his instructions he had called on Secretary Hull on the morning of October 9, 1941. In the discussion that followed concerning the proposals which had been brought up in the meeting held at the White House on September 3, 1941, Secretary Hull again proposed the extension of a nondiscriminatory policy throughout the entire Pacific area. He also said that geographical proximity could be interpreted in many ways.
Secretary Hull promised that Mr. Ballantine and other American officials would make a detailed report to the Japanese Ambassador that afternoon after the papers submitted by Ambassador Nomura had been carefully perused. Asking that the United States reconsider its attitude toward Japanese troops stationed in China, Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull of the critical political situation existing in certain parts of China which rendered military protection absolutely essential.
When the Japanese Ambassador turned the conversation to Prime Minister Konoye's adherence "in principle" to the four principles laid down by the American government, Secretary Hull immediately indicated that he was already aware of the Japanese attitude toward this matter.[454]
115. Japanese-American Conversation (October 9, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[455]
By prearrangement, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called on the Japanese Ambassador at the Japanese Embassy on October 9, 1941 in an attempt to clarify questions raised by Ambassador Nomura during his conference with Secretary Hull earlier in the day. Although the American officials had expected the discussions to pertain to the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, the Japanese officials referred constantly to their government's proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941.
According to Ambassador Nomura and his staff, which included Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Okumura, Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Obata, they desired to learn America's exact objections to their proposals of September 25, 1941. By way of reply, the American diplomats pointed out that the document of October 2, 1941 embodied the policies of the United States, and indicated the commitments it desired Japan to make. The American officials suggested that Japan compare its recently submitted proposals with those fundamental principles for peace clearly set forth by the United States during previous informal conversations and in numerous documents.
At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Nomura declared that the three questions causing a divergence in view between the two governments were: (1) The interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and the inalienable right of self-defense; (2) The application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination; and (3) The problem of Japanese troops stationed in Chinese territory. In Ambassador Nomura's opinion, the only issue presenting any real difficulty was the removal of Japanese forces from China, and he was still convinced that in a meeting with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Konoye would be able to present a satisfactory solution.
[452] Ibid.
[453] III, 258.
[454] Ibid.
[455] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 9, 1941, initialed by Mr. Max Schmidt, S.D., II, 672-677.
[104]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Besides these three basic differences, Ambassador Nomura mentioned, as further complications in the negotiations, certain problems of phraseology and the question of bringing the American draft document of June 21, 1941 up to date. The American representatives interposed that because of the changing situation in the Pacific, Secretary Hull believed that revisions such as those suggested on September 10, 1941 should be incorporated into the existing proposals. However, these revisions would constitute no substantial change in the United States' attitude toward matters which had been tentatively agreed upon in the draft of June 21, 1941.
When Ambassador Nomura asked if his country's action toward Russia and its present activities in French Indo-China had affected Japanese-American relations, the American officials pointed out that the United States was interested in the establishment of peace throughout the entire Pacific. Furthermore, the American government was firmly convinced that the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 greatly restricted the broad-gauge principles proposed by the United States.
Ambassador Nomura then declared that his government was willing to interpret independently its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in conformity with the principle of peace in the Pacific. Reiterating Japan's desire to ascertain the exact position of the American government, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the necessity of reaching a workable agreement in the near future. At the same time, however, the Japanese Ambassador reminded the United States that since the Japanese people had suffered the sacrifices of four years of war, Tokyo must conclude an agreement advantageous to its people. In the opinion of the American representatives, Japan's greatest gain would be in following a progressive and constructive program in the Pacific.
While Admiral Nomura's staff appeared disappointed that Mr. Schmidt and his colleagues had avoided a point by point discussion of the Japanese proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941, they nevertheless asserted that the aims of the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 had now been more clearly expressed. From remarks made by Ambassador Nomura to the other Japanese representatives, it appeared that a report would be sent to Tokyo stating that the Japanese government should either redraft its proposals or prepare a new document on the basis of additional consideration of the fundamental principles discussed by the two countries.[456]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[457]
On the afternoon of October 9, 1941 Mr. Hamilton, accompanied by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, delivered a reply to Ambassador Nomura from Secretary Hull. Ambassador Nomura had received instructions to determine whether the United States was in agreement with Japan upon all the points in the negotiations except the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.[458]
When questioned by the Japanese Ambassador concerning their intentions, the American officials stated that the United States had explained its policies very clearly in the memorandum of October 2, 1941. Since America sought to promote in the Pacific a peace founded on the four basic principles, the Japanese aggression northward and southward, Japan's discriminatory commercial practices in the Pacific, the refusal to withdraw Japanese troops from China and adherence to the Tripartite Pact caused the United States to be disturbed concerning the future. Desirous of applying its four basic principles to the entire Pacific area, the United States saw no reason for using different principles in different areas of the Pacific.
[456] Ibid.
[457] III, 259.
[458] III, 245.
[105]
Turning the discussion to other points in the negotiations, Ambassador Nomura asked if the United States was satisfied with Japan's explanation of its policies other than those divergent views set forth in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. The American officials answered that the basic attitude of the United States government on all questions was clearly outlined in its reply to the Japanese proposals, therefore nothing more need be added to clarify America's viewpoint. If a "meeting of minds" could be reached with regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the United States representatives appeared certain that all other questions would find a natural solution.
Ambassador Nomura reported that the American officials avoided giving any definite replies to his questions. However, they did remark that certain points in the June 21, 1941 American proposal might need revision, in view of subsequent changes in the world situation. However, the larger aspects of the existing problems remained the same. If Japan would reconsider its proposals of September 6, 1941 and submit a new document, the United States was ready to give it careful consideration.[459]
116. Foreign Minister Toyoda Is Dissatisfied with Ambassador Nomura's Reports
On October 10, 1945 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura of his belief that the negotiations had reached a decisive stage and declared that in order to bring about a definite understanding at this time, senseless procrastination must be eliminated from all future dealings. It was with this in mind that Foreign Minister Toyoda had asked Ambassador Nomura to clarify with the United States the points relative to the stationing of Japanese troops in China and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact.[460]
Yet in spite of instructions sent from Tokyo, the Japanese Ambassador continued to send his own opinions rather than those of the American officials regarding the policies of the United States. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated emphatically that what he desired was the opinions of the American officials and no others.[461] From Ambassador Nomura's report of October 9, 1941,[462] Foreign Minister Toyoda had no way of knowing whether there were any chances for further conversations with Secretary Hull. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister ordered Ambassador Nomura to submit immediately in detail the minutes of all conversations and to indicate the prospect of future negotiations. Furthermore, in any future conversations with Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura was to be accompanied by Minister Wakasugi or Mr. Iguchi.[463]
117. Ambassador Nomura Replies to Foreign Minister Toyoda's Complaint
In reply to Foreign Minister Toyoda's complaint, Ambassador Nomura reported on October 10, 1941 that the American government demanded the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.[464] In the United States' opinion, Japan's policies were semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. Because the proposals of September 6, 1941, issued by the Japanese government, diverged from agreements reached in preparatory talks, the United States refused to continue negotiations or to clarify its own statements any further.
[459] III, 259.
[460] III, 260.
[461] Ibid.
[462] III, 258.
[463] III, 260.
[464] III, 261.
[106]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would effect a compromise only in accordance with the lines set down in its memorandum of October 2, 1941. Unless such an agreement were achieved, the proposed conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States would never take place. Although the United States refused to make any further statements, it was willing to accept any future Japanese proposals meeting the specifications defined in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[465]
118. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 10, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[466]
In order to discuss the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Toyoda met on the afternoon of October 10, 1941. Although the Japanese Foreign Minister had encountered difficulty in perceiving the point of the American memorandum, he determined that three main obstacles were impeding Japanese-American relations: (1) the maintenance of Japanese troops in China, (2) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China.
In Foreign Minister Toyoda's opinion, if the United States had answered Ambassador Nomura's requests of October 3, 6 and 9, 1941 by stating definitely the commitment the United States wished Japan to make, the successful conclusion of an agreement would have been accelerated. Therefore, Foreign Minister Toyoda again requested that the United States clarify the commitments which Japan must make in order to actuate a rapprochement between the two countries.
Turning the conversation to the attitude of the Japanese press, Ambassador Grew expressed his disapproval of the criticism expressed in Japan's newspapers because of the apparent failure of the present conversations. After insisting that public opinion would be easy to control once the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had been convened, Foreign Minister Toyoda assured Ambassador Grew that the Japanese government would make far reaching commitments during that meeting, though it could not take more definite action beforehand.
However, Ambassador Grew feared that the arrival of additional Japanese forces in French Indo-China was creating a delicate situation which could adversely affect the negotiations now being attempted. In reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he had already asked the War Minister to check the activities of the Japanese authorities in French Indo-China and to remedy any aggressive action there.
Because Ambassador Nomura was apparently under considerable strain, Tokyo was considering sending an experienced diplomat to assist the Japanese Ambassador in conducting the informal conversations at Washington. In the event that such an official were chosen, Foreign Minister Toyoda, stressing the necessity for expediting the progress of the conversations, asked if the American government would arrange a plane reservation from Manila to San Francisco. Ambassador Grew offered to transmit this inquiry to the United States.[467]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[468]
Wishing to secure a clear-cut proposal from the United States, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked Ambassador Grew to call on him during the afternoon of October 10, 1941. When giving a resume of this discussion to Ambassador Nomura, two days later, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that the Japanese Ambassador in the United States continue his efforts along the same lines.
[465] Ibid.
[466] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 10, 1941, S.D., II, 677-679.
[467] Ibid.
[468] III, 262.
In order to prepare for the proposed meeting of responsible Chiefs of the Japanese and American governments, the United States had endeavored to put into effect a comprehensive program applying liberal and progressive principles uniformly to the entire Pacific area. Apparently, however, the Japanese government desired a program circumscribed by qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those nondiscriminatory principles. Under these circumstances, a meeting between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt could never hope to contribute to the advancement of the purposes which the United States desired.
Nevertheless, the United States welcomed Japan's assurances, accompanying Prime Minister Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, that it advocated the principles supported by the United States as the only sound basis for stable international relations. The United States believed that these fundamental principles must be given renewed consideration before a firm foundation could be laid for a meeting between the two governments.
The statement pointed out that President Roosevelt, still interested in the proposed meeting with Prime Minister Konoye, sincerely hoped that a discussion of the fundamental questions would add to the success of such a meeting. The United States was firmly convinced that by collaborating with Japan in the fundamental rehabilitation of mutual relations, the resulting agreement would contribute to lasting peace throughout the Pacific area, based upon justice, equity and order.[407]
After reading the document, Ambassador Nomura stated that his government would be disappointed that the proposed meeting could not take place. Once more, he assured Secretary Hull of Japan's sincerity in first suggesting that such a meeting be held,[408] but said that in view of internal difficulties, he did not believe that Japan could go further at this time. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Although expressing his own confidence in the sincerity of the Japanese Prime Minister and other officials of that government, Secretary Hull nevertheless pointed out that past actions of Japan made it impossible to remove certain doubts concerning the true aims and principles of Tokyo. For this reason, the Secretary Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire of State had insisted that a definite agreement, incorporating the peaceful policies and courses of both governments, be drawn up.
Ambassador Nomura then referred to a press report made by a member of the American Cabinet, which would undoubtedly have a bad effect on Japan's public opinion. Although admitting that certain persons in Japan had made similar statements which were detrimental to Japanese-American peace negotiations, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that they were members of the Japanese Cabinet. Secretary Hull replied that during the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and members of the American government, Mr. Matsuoka had made statements inconsistent with the spirit prompting these discussions, but Ambassador Nomura had continued the discussion despite them.
Secretary Hull believed that no proposed meeting could be held before a definite agreement in policy had been established, nor could any patchwork arrangement result in a lasting Pacific peace. It was Ambassador Nomura's opinion that the only source of difficulty was Japan's desire to retain troops in China. No dispute was expected over the question of commercial equality.
[407] Ibid.
[408] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.
[92]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Expressing the belief that Japan would benefit from the universal application of the policy of nondiscrimination, Secretary Hull referred to a report of the Lima conference, containing many economic resolutions concerning South America, which the Japanese government might adopt in the Far East.
According to Ambassador Nomura, Japan's present attitude with respect to regional economic blocs, which destroyed the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination, had resulted from measures similar to those taken at Ottawa, Canada. Since he had been fighting the adoption of such commercial policies, Secretary Hull stated that he would like Japan to join the United States in establishing liberal economic policies. At the conclusion of the conference, Ambassador Nomura again assured Secretary Hull that the Konoye Cabinet was in a comparatively strong position and it desired to reach an agreement with the United States.[409]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
Calling on Secretary Hull at his invitation at 9:00 A.M. on October 2, 1941, Ambassador Nomura received the reply of the United States to the Japanese proposals.[410] Secretary Hull stated that in the opinion of the United States a conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt would be precarious unless a "clear-cut", not a "patch up", understanding regarding the maintenance of peace throughout the whole Pacific could be arrived at beforehand. Although disappointed by the American reply, Ambassador Nomura promised to transmit the message to his government.[411]
101. Tokyo Reports Receiving America's Reply
On October 3, 1941 Tokyo reported the receipt of the United States' reply to Japan's proposal concerning the leaders' conference.
In view of the domestic situation, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that careful checks be made of newspaper articles dealing with the Japanese-American negotiations, since rumors concerning the fall of the Konoye Cabinet might endanger the success of the negotiations.[412]
102. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 3, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[413]
Ambassador Nomura had called on Secretary Hull at his own request on October 3, 1941 to report among other things that on the preceding day he had transmitted the text of the United States' reply to the Japanese proposals. In turn, Tokyo had informed the Japanese Ambassador that it was preparing a statement for public release.[414] Ambassador Nomura hoped to receive an advance copy to submit to Secretary Hull before its publication. Secretary Hull made no comment.[415]
[409] Ibid.
[410] III, 240.
[411] Ibid.
[412] III, 241.
[413] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.
[414] There is no record of such a definite statement from Tokyo in American files.
[415] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.
[93]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report
In order to expedite certain business matters for his government, Ambassador Nomura called upon Secretary Hull on October 3, 1941.[416] The Japanese Naval Ministry desired that arrangements be made to have a courier from Washington go to Hawaii, and the Japanese Foreign Office wished to purchase American oil through the transfer of Japan's unfrozen funds in South America. Although these matters ordinarily came under the cognizance of the Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission, Secretary Hull promised to intercede for the Japanese government.
Ambassador Nomura also mentioned the possibility of Japan's issuing a statement regarding the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, and said that if this were done the United States would be notified. Secretary Hull did not object.[417]
103. Foreign Minister Toyoda Obtains a Copy of British Ambassador Craigie's Report (October 3, 1941)
Since British Ambassador Robert Craigie's vacation trip to the United States had been unavoidably delayed by the sickness of his chief assistant, Foreign Minister Toyoda availed himself of the opportunity to discuss various problems involving the Japanese-American situation with him. The Japanese Foreign Minister also asked Ambassador Grew to discuss current diplomatic relations with the British Ambassador.
As a result of both these meetings, Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that Ambassador Craigie had cabled Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Ambassador Halifax in support of the proposals for an immediate conference between the United States and Japan. However, in view of the secret source of this information, Ambassador Nomura was asked not to disclose it.[418]
Since Ambassador Nomura was furnished with the gist of Ambassador Craigie's report to the British government, several interesting possibilities exist concerning the method by which the Japanese obtained it. Though Ambassador Craigie might have given the report to the Japanese Foreign Office, this seems improbable in view of Foreign Minister Toyoda's use of the phrase "according to absolutely unimpeachable sources", instead of mentioning the British Ambassador, and his instructions to Ambassador Nomura concerning absolute secrecy in the matter.[419]
The report might have been obtained through espionage activities. Another interesting possibility is that the Japanese were reading the British diplomatic codes at this time, though there is no other evidence to indicate their success in this field. However, in the absence of definite information, no decision can be reached as to the source of this intelligence.
According to Ambassador Craigie's report to London, the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had increased the chances for Japan's turning from the Axis powers toward the democracies. The British Ambassador pointed out that if such a change were to benefit Japan it must take place without delay. Since at the present time Japan could enter into nothing more than a temporary understanding, the United States was endangering the ultimate success of the negotiations by arguing over every word and phrase as though it were essential to the conclusion of any preliminary agreement. It was apparent, Ambassador Craigie believed, that the American government did not understand domestic conditions in Japan.[420]
[416] III, 242.
[417] Ibid.
[418] III, 243.
[419] Ibid.
[420] III, 244.
[94]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In spite of the strong opposition within Japan arising from Prince Konoye's reversal of policy, the Japanese Prime Minister retained his desire to avoid the dangers connected with the Tripartite Pact. If this opportunity for the settlement of Far Eastern problems were lost and the leaders' conference failed to materialize, Ambassador Craigie declared that the Konoye Cabinet would be placed in a precarious position.
Though Ambassador Craigie was aware that many other factors were complicating the consideration of negotiations, both he and the American Ambassador in Japan agreed that this favorable opportunity should not be allowed to slip by because of the unduly suspicious attitude of the United States. However, he agreed that until Prime Minister Konoye's principles actually materialized, retaliatory economic pressure against Japan should be continued.[421]
104. Foreign Minister Toyoda Directs Ambassador Nomura to Submit Another Japanese Explanation
On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to indicate to American authorities that since the Japanese attitude regarding certain fundamental points had been explained theoretically to the satisfaction of the United States, the actual opening of negotiations should now be possible.[422] Although there remained three points upon which divergent views were still held, namely: economic activity in the Pacific, the withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese government was certain that the United States had a clear comprehension of the other issues.
Though Prime Minister Konoye approved in principle of the four basic principles underlying the present negotiations, this did not preclude certain differences of opinion regarding their actual application which Prime Minister Konoye desired to consider at the time of the negotiations. The Japanese government had managed its domestic affairs in order to accomplish this, and it wanted Ambassador Nomura to see to it that the United States did not misunderstand the situation.[423]
105. Ambassador Nomura Apologizes for His Hasty Conclusions
During the period of informal negotiations between Japan and the United States, Ambassador Nomura and Foreign Minister Toyoda often disagreed as to policy and principles. On October 4, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, asking that Foreign Minister Toyoda excuse the careless remarks he had sent to Tokyo on the preceding day, explained that his actions had resulted only from the most profound concern for Japan at this critical moment of its history, and that he was deeply impressed with Foreign Minister Toyoda's tremendous efforts since his appointment and throughout the negotiations.[424]
Ambassador Nomura believed that before Japan was able to become self-sufficient as a result of the sphere of co-prosperity, a drastic economic reorganization would have to take place which would be difficult to carry out. Expressing a doubt about a northward advance, the Japanese Ambassador believed that a move to the south might obtain a Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire profitable foothold after several years.[425]
[421] Ibid.
[422] III, 245.
[423] Ibid.
[424] III, 246.
[425] Ibid.
[95]
106. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests an Immediate Reply to His Message of October 4, 1941
Since Foreign Minister Toyoda had not yet received any information from Ambassador Nomura regarding America's attitude toward the points outlined in his message of October 4, 1941,[426] he informed the Japanese Ambassador on October 17, 1941 that the Japanese government was unable to continue its consideration of the United States' memorandum. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister requested that Ambassador Nomura submit a report with the utmost speed.[427]
On the following day Ambassador Nomura's report had not yet been received in Tokyo. Since the internal situation in Japan would not permit further delay, Foreign Minister Toyoda again stated that until he had received the American reply to his telegram, the Japanese government could not continue its discussions concerning the American memorandum. Therefore, he again urged that Ambassador Nomura reply at once.[428]
107. Japanese-American Conversation
Breakfasting with Mr. Eugene Dooman in Tokyo on the morning of October 7, 1941, Mr. Ushiba discussed the precarious position in which Prince Konoye now found himself because the preliminary conversations with the United States had failed to make progress. Since the latest Japanese proposal for reconciliation between the two countries had not been accepted, the opposition in Japan now had an opportunity to criticize the Konoye Cabinet.[429]
Although in its anxiety to end the China Incident the army had given Prince Konoye unqualified support, he would now have to accept responsibility for the present failure. No one else would take a similar risk or would have the political prestige to gain support of the army in settling the China Incident by negotiation.
Pessimism in the army as well as in the other Japanese official circles had greatly increased because of the failure of the American government to state the precise measures it wished Japan to take. In fact, since the receipt of the memorandum of October 2, 1941 from the United States, many in Japanese governmental circles believed that after America had obtained a definite declaration of Japan's policies and objectives, with no intention of formulating any understanding with Tokyo, America felt justified in maintaining an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan because its objectives differed from their own. Refuting this conjecture, Mr. Dooman stated that the memorandum of October 2, 1941 had been a direct result of American public opinion which demanded that there be an agreement on certain fundamental points prior to any formal negotiations.
Nevertheless, Mr. Ushiba insisted that the American memorandum was not only extremely argumentative, preceptive and uncompromising, but it also contained no suggestions calculated toward helping the Japanese government to meet the desires of the United States. At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Ushiba said that the only thing left for Japan to do was to ask the American government to specify exactly the commitments it wished Japan to make, and if a definite reply were not forthcoming, to end the conversations.[430]
[426] III, 245.
[427] III, 247.
[428] III, 248.
[429] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 662-663.
[430] Ibid.
[96]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
108. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 7, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[431]
Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Grew call on the morning of October 7, 1941 to discuss the American memorandum presented to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941. Because the American Embassy had received only a resume of that document, Ambassador Grew declined to make any comments.
Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that not only had he been informed of Ambassador Grew's private meeting with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, but also he knew that Ambassador Grew had communicated Prince Konoye's statements to President Roosevelt through Secretary Hull in "a personal and private message". Since the Prime Minister's statements had been unofficial and merely those of an individual in the Japanese government, it had not been expected that they would be incorporated into a public American document which would be circulated among Japanese officials having no knowledge of Prince Konoye's meetings with Ambassador Grew. However, because Prince Konoye's opinion had been expressed inaccurately in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Japan felt it necessary to clarify the record.
In spite of the fact that the American document had maintained that Prince Konoye fully subscribed to the four points contained in the memorandum of October 2, 1941, actually the Prime Minister had accepted the four point program only "in principle", and had indicated that some adjustment would be required in their application to actual conditions. Ambassador Grew interpolated the comment that there was no doubt as to the accuracy of his report concerning the Japanese Prime Minister's statement. Foreign Minister Toyoda then stated that following the complete examination of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, further comments would be forthcoming. In the meantime, the Japanese Foreign Minister, referring to the unofficial draft statement presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 as well as Prince Konoye's unofficial statement of September 6, 1941, requested that misunderstandings arising from a discussion of such "technical procedure" should be avoided until some real progress had been made.
Foreign Minister Toyoda commented briefly on the United States' desire to revert to the status quo which had prevailed four years ago in the Pacific. Because Japan had been involved in large scale warfare since that time, a return to the situation previously existing would entail basic adjustments in Japan.
When asked for his own private opinion on the position of the United States according to the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew replied that America was endeavoring to ensure that Japan would observe those principles designed to achieve lasting peace in the Pacific area.[432]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[433]
On October 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him to discuss the American reply to the Japanese proposals. Assuming that the American Ambassador had also received a copy of the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired concerning Mr. Grew's opinions on the document. However, since Ambassador Grew had received only a resume of his government's memorandum, he was loath to express an opinion without having read the full text.
[431] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 663-665.
[432] Ibid.
[433] III, 249.
[97]
Certain that this resume contained the most important points of the American memorandum, and would facilitate the forming of an opinion, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Grew cooperate in reaching an understanding by voicing his ideas. Although forced to base his statements on an inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, Ambassador Grew replied that the United States was undoubtedly attempting to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.
Remarking bluntly that the Japanese government was dissatisfied with the American reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the United States did not understand the domestic and external conditions affecting Japan. Assuring the Japanese Foreign Minister that recently he had submitted a fourteen page report on the various changes seen during his many years in Japan, Ambassador Grew said that he had described fully the sincere efforts made by the Japanese government to effect a compromise with America. However, Ambassador Grew did not continue the discussion of this matter.
Foreign Minister Toyoda then discussed certain phrases used in the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941 which did not meet the approval of the Japanese government. Although it stated that Prime Minister Konoye had "fully subscribed" to the four principles laid down by the United States, actually the record of the meeting between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Prime Minister clearly showed that Prince Konoye had agreed to these policies "in principle" only.
When Ambassador Grew insisted that he had reported the discussion accurately to his government because he had been fully aware of the importance of each word spoken, Foreign Minister Toyoda agreed that the matter was important and that his notes clearly recorded an agreement in principle only. In view then of this error the Japanese government took the liberty of changing the term "fully" to "in principle". In order to have the statement coincide with that made in the original discussion, Prime Minister Toyoda ordered that this correction be made in the copies of the American memorandum sent to Ambassador Nomura and other authorized persons for their perusal. Ambassador Grew thanked the Japanese Foreign Minister for reporting this discrepancy to him.
After explaining that he had no desire to become too argumentative, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked by what authority the United States had quoted a passage from Prime Minister Konoye's private message to President Roosevelt in an official American document. Agreeing with Foreign Minister Toyoda wholeheartedly, Ambassador Grew stated that the error must have been due to faulty handling of the papers in the State Department. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, Ambassador Grew seemed to recall that it was Ambassador Nomura who had accepted the four principles unconditionally.
Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if this misunderstanding had been caused by careless handling of certain papers by Japanese representatives, it would be necessary to make amends at a future date, since any action taken now would involve the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. Since Ambassador Nomura himself had caused a misunderstanding by submitting a personal note on September 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed it advisable to do nothing further at the present time.[434]
109. Mr. Terasaki Interviews Ambassador Grew[435]
On the day following Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with the American Ambassador, Mr. Terasaki requested Ambassador Grew to discuss from an entirely personal and unofficial standpoint the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[436]
[434] Ibid.
[435] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 8, 1941, S.D., II, 666-667.
[436] Ibid.
[98]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The American Ambassador said the memorandum, friendly in tone and helpful in substance, indicated the desire of the United States to make progress in the conversations. When asked by Mr. Terasaki what actions the United States wished Japan to take in order to reach a mutual agreement, Ambassador Grew replied that three major points which had caught his eye were: (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) the application to the entire Pacific area of certain Japanese assurances which appeared limited to the southwest Pacific; and (3) Japanese claims for special privileges in China as a result of geographical propinquity to that country.
Pointing out that many prominent Japanese officials were comparing the Monroe Doctrine and the United States' relationship to Latin American countries with Japan's position in the Far East, Ambassador Grew emphasized that the two situations were not at all analogous. Since the American Ambassador and Mr. Terasaki could not agree on this point it was not pursued further.
Turning to America's desire for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from both China and French Indo-China, Mr. Terasaki asked if Japan must take action before a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye took place. Explaining that he was not in a position to interpret the State Department's phraseology, Ambassador Grew nevertheless expressed his private opinion that in view of previous failures of Japan to live up to its promises his government desired to see concrete evidence of Japan's "manifest intentions" to withdraw its forces from occupied territories.
Ambassador Grew then reminded Mr. Terasaki that Secretary Hull desired that informal discussions relating to both Japanese and American proposals be held in Washington. Though Mr. Terasaki expressed surprise at this, Ambassador Grew said that he had conveyed this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda. If Japan were uncertain regarding any portion of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew suggested that Ambassador Nomura seek an interview with Secretary Hull.
Because Mr. Terasaki referred during the conversation to America's suggestion that Japan declare publicly its intention to withdraw its troops from China and French Indo-China, Ambassador Grew was certain that Japan thoroughly understood this point.[437]
110. Tokyo Explains Background of Japanese-American Negotiations to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
In a message to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on October 8, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda summarized the background of the current Japanese negotiations with America. The Japanese-American informal conversations had been inaugurated during the administration of the second Konoye Cabinet, but a rupture had occurred when Japan felt it necessary to penetrate into French Indo-China in order to hasten the end of the China Incident, break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense, and procure essential materials. Although its action had been motivated solely by self defense, according to Japan, England and the United States had imposed an economic blockade upon Japan with the result that diplomatic relations had deteriorated and the internal situation existing in Japan had become extremely critical.[438]
When the war between Germany and Russia had become a protracted struggle, contrary to German expectations, the United States and England came to Russia's assistance. Commerce between Europe and Asia had been disrupted, and Japanese liaison with Germany and Italy had been severed.[439]
[437] Ibid.
[438] III, 250.
[439] Ibid.
[99]
Meanwhile, England and the United States had tightened their economic net about Japan, preventing the Japanese government from concluding its war with China. As a result Japan had attempted to negotiate with the United States so that hostilities with the Chinese could be terminated under satisfactory conditions and an era of co-prosperity could be established in East Asia during which time Japan's natural resources could be conserved for the future. By means of diplomatic negotiations Japan had intended to open the way for a compromise with the United States to ensure its own economic stability.
After concluding the Tripartite Pact, Japan had attempted to include Russia in the Japanese-German-Italian Pact, and by using German Ambassador Stahmer in negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow, to effect a solution to any problems in the north. Mr. Ott had also promised to work for an understanding between Japan and Soviet Russia. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Japan also had intended to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy in return for certain mechanical and technical assistance. However, unexpected events had occurred recently and at the present time Japan could conclude the China Incident promptly only by maintaining amicable relations with the United States.[440]
Since Germany as well as Japan recognized the need for preventing the United States from entering the European war, during the Matsuoka-Stahmer conversations, it promised to spare no effort to improve relations between the United States and Japan. In fact, the Tripartite Pact had been intended to establish universal peace by preventing the spread of the European war and restraining the United States from participating in it. Now, however, the European war affected all the countries of Europe; only the Pacific remained untouched. In conformity with the original spirit of the Tripartite Pact, therefore, Japan believed it advisable to investigate the causes of any problems existing between Japan and the United States in order to ensure harmony in the Pacific area.[441]
With this objective in view, Mr. Matsuoka's Cabinet had begun negotiations with Washington, and even after a new Cabinet had come into power, Prime Minister Konoye felt the need for continuing them. At the very moment when Tokyo and Washington had been arguing over the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, Prime Minister Konoye had suggested that a conference between President Roosevelt and himself would establish the foundation for an understanding between the two governments.
Since the time of that proposal, conversations had been held for the purpose of exchanging opinions prior to the major meeting. On October 4, 1941 Japan received the American memorandum concerning the proposal for a leaders' conference which had been forwarded from its Embassy in Washington. The document was now under study by the Japanese Foreign Minister.
Current negotiations diverged in no way from the principles contained in the Tripartite Pact. Japan merely wished to conclude its hostilities with China through a basic treaty by which the United States would coerce the Chiang regime into allowing Japan to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia. To ensure economic stability and peace in the Pacific area Japan desired to prevent the expansion of the European war, and particularly, the United States' participation in it.[442]
[440] III, 251.
[441] III, 252.
[442] III, 253.
[100]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
111. Ambassador Nomura Explains the American Attitude Toward the Japanese Proposals
On October 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised Foreign Minister Toyoda of his personnel opinion regarding the American attitude toward the Japanese proposals.[443] According to the Japanese Ambassador, the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 made it apparent that the United States intended to base any further negotiations with Japan on the four original principles laid down during the first preliminary discussions. Since the United States believed it necessary, before settling the Pacific question, to achieve unanimity on the fundamental questions, previously explored by both nations in their unofficial talks, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American government would not agree to a meeting between the leaders of the two countries until it was clearly determined that the four principles would be applied concretely to the problems of the Pacific area. Dissatisfied because Japan would not discuss these policies in detail, the United States demanded further clarification of Japanese views.[444]
Ambassador Nomura agreed with American officials that in Japan's proposals submitted on September 6, 1941 and in its subsequent explanation Japan had limited the scope of the previous informal conversations and had curtailed the guarantees concerning the aforementioned principles. Japan had not only refused to guarantee wholeheartedly that it would stop armed aggression, but it had limited the extent of commercial nondiscrimination. Using geographic propinquity as an excuse, Japan hoped to secure more favorable economic conditions for itself in China. Therefore, the question of garrisoning Japanese troops in China and French Indo-China remained a major obstacle in the negotiations. Moreover, a clearer explanation of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact was requested by American officials.[445]
Since the United States firmly believed that any disagreement on the four basic principles would prevent the success of future discussions, it wished to obtain unanimity regarding their interpretation and then gradually turn to a discussion of matters relating to them. Because it had been made evident in the United States proposals of June 2, 1941 that the United States intended to retain those four principles as a basis for any negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were being disregarded. Nevertheless, the Japanese Ambassador advised that further discussions be held concerning the China Incident and the discontinuation of American activities designed to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Other matters in the latest Japanese proposal which needed clarification included the stipulation concerning the Nanking Treaty in the clause relating to the China Incident, joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning the Japanese attitude toward the European war, and the question of eliminating the annex to the clause regarding commerce between the United States and Japan.[446]
Ambassador Nomura drew to Foreign Minister Toyoda's attention the fact that, during the conversations in Tokyo, Ambassador Grew had assumed that an understanding had already been reached by Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull on the four basic principles. But on April 16, 1941 when Secretary Hull first presented the four principles to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador had not felt authorized to accept such a proposal before receiving instructions from his government.
[443] III, 254.
[444] III, Ibid.
[445] III, 255.
[446] III, 256.
[101]
Although Ambassador Nomura had been careful not to give the impression that Japan would accept the principles, he nevertheless believed that because of their abstractness they would be applied with some elasticity by the United States. Since discussions of principles in any peace conference were often circumlocutory, Ambassador Nomura did not feel that his government should become particularly troubled over this aspect of the situation.[447]
112. Mr. Terasaki Calls on Mr. Dooman (October 9, 1941)
Although on the preceding day he had received Ambassador Grew's opinion concerning the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Mr. Terasaki called upon Counselor Dooman to receive his personal observations regarding the same document.[448] Since Ambassador Grew had reported his conversation to the American Embassy, Mr. Dooman did not feel that he was in a position to elaborate further on this matter. Nevertheless, Mr. Terasaki insisted on summarizing his discussion with Ambassador Grew, continually emphasizing the American Ambassador's belief that the American memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance.
Since the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China was a major point in the United States' memorandum, Mr. Terasaki asked whether Japan was expected to execute such a move before President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye conferred. Admitting that such an interpretation might be applied, Mr. Dooman pointed out that the American government hesitated to enter any formal negotiations as long as Japanese troops continued to exercise complete control over French Indo-China as though it were a Japanese colony. When Mr. Terasaki expressed ignorance of such a situation existing in French Indo-China, Mr. Dooman referred to the arrest of French and Chinese nationals, the seizure of private property, airfields and military barracks, and threats to seize the Customs.
Mr. Terasaki then turned the conversation to the Japanese formula for the application of equality throughout the southwest Pacific. Mr. Dooman believed that Japan did not intend to confine its policy of nondiscrimination solely to the southwest Pacific, and he did not feel that this issue should constitute any obstacle to peace negotiations. On the other hand, Mr. Terasaki agreed that Japan's explanations of its proposals were open to the very implications which Japan had desired to avoid.
Returning to the problem of recalling Japanese troops from China, Mr. Terasaki attempted to define his government's position by pointing out that Tokyo could not withdraw its forces until an agreement had been reached between Japan and China. As a demonstration of Japan's desire for peace, Mr. Dooman suggested that the Japanese government furnish a time schedule for the withdrawal of the troops or consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese government, with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China.[449]
113. Mr. Dooman Warns Mr. Terasaki Against New Japanese Troop Landings in French Indo-China.
Later that same day, learning that Japan was prepared to land 50,000 additional troops in Tonking, French Indo-China on or about October 15, 1941, Mr. Dooman returned Mr. Terasaki's call to warn him of the serious consequences which might follow such a move.[450] Mr. Dooman then reminded Mr. Terasaki that the situation created by the first Japanese landings in July, 1941 had ended the informal conversations then in progress between the two governments.
[447] III, 257.
[448] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 667-669.
[449] Ibid.
[450] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 669-670.
[102]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Stating that he was unaware of such a plan of the Japanese military force, Mr. Terasaki assured Mr. Dooman that he would immediately convey this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda.
114. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 9, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[451]
After first expressing Japan's appreciation of the American attitude toward the visit of three requisitioned Japanese ships to the United States, Ambassador Nomura referred to the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. Following his recent instructions from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested Secretary Hull to express his reactions to those points entailing a divergence of view between the two governments.
In Ambassador Nomura's opinion there were three main questions to be decided: (1) the relation of Japan and the United States to the European war; (2) the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas of China; and (3) the application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination to the entire Pacific area.
At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull declared that America had been disturbed at the modifications and restrictions which the Japanese proposals imposed upon the broad program originally planned to ensure peace and stability throughout the entire Pacific. Although the principle of nondiscrimination in international trade had been intended to pertain to the entire Pacific area, Japan had greatly limited its practical application. Furthermore, because of its propinquity to China, Japan apparently intended to reserve special privileges for itself in that country.
Secretary Hull suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Japanese Ambassador to clarify the aims of their respective governments. It was then agreed to have this meeting take place later in the afternoon.
Although Prince Konoye had informed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that he personally subscribed in principle to Secretary Hull's four basic points for peace, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that certain problems, particularly in regard to China, remained to be solved. Since chaos would undoubtedly arise from the conflicting policies of the Kuomingtang and the Communistic parties in China, the withdrawal of Japanese troops would endanger Tokyo's commercial enterprises there and place Japan itself in a dangerous position.
Ambassador Nomura did not respond when Secretary Hull asked if the Chinese government would accept the stationing of Japanese troops in its country. Secretary Hull believed that a sufficient number of Chinese troops might be trained to maintain order in their own country. From the United States' experience in Latin America, Secretary Hull continued, the stationing of any troops in a foreign country perpetuated a feeling of ill will. To stress his point further Secretary Hull referred to the situation existing in the United States after the Civil War when northern troops were retained in the southern states.
Ambassador Nomura answered that Japan was now at a political crossroad. Expressing only his own personal opinion, the Japanese Ambassador believed that the majority of the Japanese people supported the renewal of amicable relations with the United States, in spite of agitators within the government who were attempting to disrupt peaceful negotiations. Because war between Japan and the United States would be such a serious undertaking, Ambassador Nomura desired that everything possible be done to avert the possibility of conflict.
[451] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 9, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 670-672.
[103]
In the course of this discussion both Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura exchanged compliments concerning their mutual regard for the other's integrity and frankness of expression.[452]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[453]
Ambassador Nomura reported that in accordance with his instructions he had called on Secretary Hull on the morning of October 9, 1941. In the discussion that followed concerning the proposals which had been brought up in the meeting held at the White House on September 3, 1941, Secretary Hull again proposed the extension of a nondiscriminatory policy throughout the entire Pacific area. He also said that geographical proximity could be interpreted in many ways.
Secretary Hull promised that Mr. Ballantine and other American officials would make a detailed report to the Japanese Ambassador that afternoon after the papers submitted by Ambassador Nomura had been carefully perused. Asking that the United States reconsider its attitude toward Japanese troops stationed in China, Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull of the critical political situation existing in certain parts of China which rendered military protection absolutely essential.
When the Japanese Ambassador turned the conversation to Prime Minister Konoye's adherence "in principle" to the four principles laid down by the American government, Secretary Hull immediately indicated that he was already aware of the Japanese attitude toward this matter.[454]
115. Japanese-American Conversation (October 9, 1941)
(a) State Department's Report[455]
By prearrangement, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called on the Japanese Ambassador at the Japanese Embassy on October 9, 1941 in an attempt to clarify questions raised by Ambassador Nomura during his conference with Secretary Hull earlier in the day. Although the American officials had expected the discussions to pertain to the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, the Japanese officials referred constantly to their government's proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941.
According to Ambassador Nomura and his staff, which included Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Okumura, Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Obata, they desired to learn America's exact objections to their proposals of September 25, 1941. By way of reply, the American diplomats pointed out that the document of October 2, 1941 embodied the policies of the United States, and indicated the commitments it desired Japan to make. The American officials suggested that Japan compare its recently submitted proposals with those fundamental principles for peace clearly set forth by the United States during previous informal conversations and in numerous documents.
At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Nomura declared that the three questions causing a divergence in view between the two governments were: (1) The interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and the inalienable right of self-defense; (2) The application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination; and (3) The problem of Japanese troops stationed in Chinese territory. In Ambassador Nomura's opinion, the only issue presenting any real difficulty was the removal of Japanese forces from China, and he was still convinced that in a meeting with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Konoye would be able to present a satisfactory solution.
[452] Ibid.
[453] III, 258.
[454] Ibid.
[455] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 9, 1941, initialed by Mr. Max Schmidt, S.D., II, 672-677.
[104]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Besides these three basic differences, Ambassador Nomura mentioned, as further complications in the negotiations, certain problems of phraseology and the question of bringing the American draft document of June 21, 1941 up to date. The American representatives interposed that because of the changing situation in the Pacific, Secretary Hull believed that revisions such as those suggested on September 10, 1941 should be incorporated into the existing proposals. However, these revisions would constitute no substantial change in the United States' attitude toward matters which had been tentatively agreed upon in the draft of June 21, 1941.
When Ambassador Nomura asked if his country's action toward Russia and its present activities in French Indo-China had affected Japanese-American relations, the American officials pointed out that the United States was interested in the establishment of peace throughout the entire Pacific. Furthermore, the American government was firmly convinced that the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 greatly restricted the broad-gauge principles proposed by the United States.
Ambassador Nomura then declared that his government was willing to interpret independently its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in conformity with the principle of peace in the Pacific. Reiterating Japan's desire to ascertain the exact position of the American government, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the necessity of reaching a workable agreement in the near future. At the same time, however, the Japanese Ambassador reminded the United States that since the Japanese people had suffered the sacrifices of four years of war, Tokyo must conclude an agreement advantageous to its people. In the opinion of the American representatives, Japan's greatest gain would be in following a progressive and constructive program in the Pacific.
While Admiral Nomura's staff appeared disappointed that Mr. Schmidt and his colleagues had avoided a point by point discussion of the Japanese proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941, they nevertheless asserted that the aims of the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 had now been more clearly expressed. From remarks made by Ambassador Nomura to the other Japanese representatives, it appeared that a report would be sent to Tokyo stating that the Japanese government should either redraft its proposals or prepare a new document on the basis of additional consideration of the fundamental principles discussed by the two countries.[456]
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[457]
On the afternoon of October 9, 1941 Mr. Hamilton, accompanied by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, delivered a reply to Ambassador Nomura from Secretary Hull. Ambassador Nomura had received instructions to determine whether the United States was in agreement with Japan upon all the points in the negotiations except the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.[458]
When questioned by the Japanese Ambassador concerning their intentions, the American officials stated that the United States had explained its policies very clearly in the memorandum of October 2, 1941. Since America sought to promote in the Pacific a peace founded on the four basic principles, the Japanese aggression northward and southward, Japan's discriminatory commercial practices in the Pacific, the refusal to withdraw Japanese troops from China and adherence to the Tripartite Pact caused the United States to be disturbed concerning the future. Desirous of applying its four basic principles to the entire Pacific area, the United States saw no reason for using different principles in different areas of the Pacific.
[456] Ibid.
[457] III, 259.
[458] III, 245.
[105]
Turning the discussion to other points in the negotiations, Ambassador Nomura asked if the United States was satisfied with Japan's explanation of its policies other than those divergent views set forth in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. The American officials answered that the basic attitude of the United States government on all questions was clearly outlined in its reply to the Japanese proposals, therefore nothing more need be added to clarify America's viewpoint. If a "meeting of minds" could be reached with regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the United States representatives appeared certain that all other questions would find a natural solution.
Ambassador Nomura reported that the American officials avoided giving any definite replies to his questions. However, they did remark that certain points in the June 21, 1941 American proposal might need revision, in view of subsequent changes in the world situation. However, the larger aspects of the existing problems remained the same. If Japan would reconsider its proposals of September 6, 1941 and submit a new document, the United States was ready to give it careful consideration.[459]
116. Foreign Minister Toyoda Is Dissatisfied with Ambassador Nomura's Reports
On October 10, 1945 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura of his belief that the negotiations had reached a decisive stage and declared that in order to bring about a definite understanding at this time, senseless procrastination must be eliminated from all future dealings. It was with this in mind that Foreign Minister Toyoda had asked Ambassador Nomura to clarify with the United States the points relative to the stationing of Japanese troops in China and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact.[460]
Yet in spite of instructions sent from Tokyo, the Japanese Ambassador continued to send his own opinions rather than those of the American officials regarding the policies of the United States. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated emphatically that what he desired was the opinions of the American officials and no others.[461] From Ambassador Nomura's report of October 9, 1941,[462] Foreign Minister Toyoda had no way of knowing whether there were any chances for further conversations with Secretary Hull. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister ordered Ambassador Nomura to submit immediately in detail the minutes of all conversations and to indicate the prospect of future negotiations. Furthermore, in any future conversations with Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura was to be accompanied by Minister Wakasugi or Mr. Iguchi.[463]
117. Ambassador Nomura Replies to Foreign Minister Toyoda's Complaint
In reply to Foreign Minister Toyoda's complaint, Ambassador Nomura reported on October 10, 1941 that the American government demanded the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.[464] In the United States' opinion, Japan's policies were semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. Because the proposals of September 6, 1941, issued by the Japanese government, diverged from agreements reached in preparatory talks, the United States refused to continue negotiations or to clarify its own statements any further.
[459] III, 259.
[460] III, 260.
[461] Ibid.
[462] III, 258.
[463] III, 260.
[464] III, 261.
[106]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would effect a compromise only in accordance with the lines set down in its memorandum of October 2, 1941. Unless such an agreement were achieved, the proposed conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States would never take place. Although the United States refused to make any further statements, it was willing to accept any future Japanese proposals meeting the specifications defined in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[465]
118. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 10, 1941)
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[466]
In order to discuss the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Toyoda met on the afternoon of October 10, 1941. Although the Japanese Foreign Minister had encountered difficulty in perceiving the point of the American memorandum, he determined that three main obstacles were impeding Japanese-American relations: (1) the maintenance of Japanese troops in China, (2) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China.
In Foreign Minister Toyoda's opinion, if the United States had answered Ambassador Nomura's requests of October 3, 6 and 9, 1941 by stating definitely the commitment the United States wished Japan to make, the successful conclusion of an agreement would have been accelerated. Therefore, Foreign Minister Toyoda again requested that the United States clarify the commitments which Japan must make in order to actuate a rapprochement between the two countries.
Turning the conversation to the attitude of the Japanese press, Ambassador Grew expressed his disapproval of the criticism expressed in Japan's newspapers because of the apparent failure of the present conversations. After insisting that public opinion would be easy to control once the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had been convened, Foreign Minister Toyoda assured Ambassador Grew that the Japanese government would make far reaching commitments during that meeting, though it could not take more definite action beforehand.
However, Ambassador Grew feared that the arrival of additional Japanese forces in French Indo-China was creating a delicate situation which could adversely affect the negotiations now being attempted. In reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he had already asked the War Minister to check the activities of the Japanese authorities in French Indo-China and to remedy any aggressive action there.
Because Ambassador Nomura was apparently under considerable strain, Tokyo was considering sending an experienced diplomat to assist the Japanese Ambassador in conducting the informal conversations at Washington. In the event that such an official were chosen, Foreign Minister Toyoda, stressing the necessity for expediting the progress of the conversations, asked if the American government would arrange a plane reservation from Manila to San Francisco. Ambassador Grew offered to transmit this inquiry to the United States.[467]
(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[468]
Wishing to secure a clear-cut proposal from the United States, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked Ambassador Grew to call on him during the afternoon of October 10, 1941. When giving a resume of this discussion to Ambassador Nomura, two days later, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that the Japanese Ambassador in the United States continue his efforts along the same lines.
[465] Ibid.
[466] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 10, 1941, S.D., II, 677-679.
[467] Ibid.
[468] III, 262.
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
ice 5.ice.0 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Synopsis
Kyle falls into an ice hole and when Stan comes to rescue him, they find a frozen man embedded in the ice. The boys pull the ice man out, Mephesto takes the ice man back to his laboratory to thaw him out. He discovers that the ice man has been frozen since 1996. The government wants to get him for their own experiments, but Stan and Kyle free him, so the government hires Steve Irwin (from "Crocodile Hunter") to track him down.
Full Recap
After watching The Crocodile Hunter the boys decide to go searching for crocodiles. Kyle trips on a stone and slides down a hill and falls into a hole. At the bottom of the hole, Kyle finds he is in a cave. When Stan comes down to rescue him he discovers a prehistoric iceman. Kyle and Stan speculate on what kind of reward they might get for finding the icemen. Somehow, the 4 boys manage to get a man encased in a block of ice out of the hole. Stan decides that iceman's name should be “Gorak” and Kyle thinks it should be “Steve.” And so Stan and Kyle begin their fight over who should get the credit for finding the iceman. The town is debating capital punishment, when the boys arrive with the icemen. Dr. Mephisto arrives on the scene and agrees to thaw the iceman. He can't reward the boys, but lets them give the iceman a name. Kyle quickly yells out “Steve.” Dr. Mephisto starts thawing the iceman and determines that given his clothing, he must be from 1996. Reporters arrive on the scene and Kyle has been given credit for the discovery, much to the chagrin of Stan. Dr. Mephisto is ready to do the autopsy when they realize that the iceman is still alive. Dr. Mephisto (oblivious to the fact that “Steve” is speaking perfectly good English) seeks out a way to communicate with the thawed iceman. He decides the simple mind of a child will do the trick, so he requests that Officer Barbrady bring one of boys to help. All the boys arrive at the lab, where Stan easily communicates with “Steve.” Then “Steve” freaks out when he finds out that he has been frozen for 32 months. Dr. Mephisto gives him a sedative. Kyle blames Stan for causing the freak out and they begin to fight, each claiming to the other that Cartman is now his best friend.
Some men arrive and offer to help Dr. Mephisto with his experiments with the iceman. Dr. Mephisto shows them the habit that he and Kevin have setup for the iceman, which duplicates the environment of 1996. The men help Dr. Mephisto raise funds for his experiments by putting the iceman on display. The boys object to the iceman being put on display. Later that night, Stan comes to bust "Gorak" out and Kyle also arrives on the scene with plans to rescue "Steve." Stan and Kyle begin fighting over who is going to do the rescuing; when Stan opens for the door for the iceman whose real name is Larry. Larry leaves the lab while the boys are in the midst of their fight, which ends with them planning to fight at the bus stop the following afternoon. Meanwhile, Larry is out wandering the streets of South Park. Dr. Mephisto and the men discover the iceman's escape and wonder where he might have gone off to. The men realize they will need "special assistance" to find the iceman. Larry arrives at the door of his home and when his wife answers, she doesn't recognize him. She introduces him to current lover and tells him the story of their attempt to rescue him. Larry is dejected and decides that he might as well refreeze himself. Stan is talking to him as he is doing this, when Kyle arrives on the scene, with some information for "Steve." Kyle shows him a brochure for Des Moines, a place that is two years behind the time, just like Larry. Both Kyle and Stan plan to get the iceman to Des Moines and escape just as Dr. Mephisto and the men arrive on the scene. They've brought their specialist with them, The "Crocodile Hunter," who claims he can track anything.
Stan and Kyle try to buy Larry a one-way train ticket to Des Moines. The boys pause for a moment to start their fight. The “Crocodile Hunter” is one the trail of iceman, when he gets distracted by the Rocky Mountain rattler. Larry gets his train ticket and thanks Stan and Kyle for their help, telling them what he's learned about friendship, as Stan and Kyle continue to beat the crap out of each other. The train leaves the station as Dr. Mephisto, the men and the Crocodile Hunter arrives at the scene. They all go in pursuit of the train and catch up to it. The Crocodile Hunter manages to corner Larry and gets his thumb in Larry's butt hole. The men, with aid of a helicopter manage to stop the train. The blades from the helicopter manage to dice and slice the Crocodile Hunter quite nicely. Dr. Mephisto and the men search for Larry, who manages to steal the helicopter and escape to Des Moines. The men, who it turns out, were from the government; have to give up on their plans to use the iceman in their plot against Sweden. Kyle and Stan agree to become best friends again as "Crocodile Hunter" Cartman attempts to stick his thumb in the butt hole of a cow.
Kenny dies when he pulled underneath the conveyor used for the tourists in the iceman display. As they are in the midst of their fight when this happens, when Stan says his catchphrase "Oh my God, they killed Kenny…," he waits for Kyle's standard response, which doesn't come. Kyle looks at him and says "What? I'm not talking to you."
Kyle falls into an ice hole and when Stan comes to rescue him, they find a frozen man embedded in the ice. The boys pull the ice man out, Mephesto takes the ice man back to his laboratory to thaw him out. He discovers that the ice man has been frozen since 1996. The government wants to get him for their own experiments, but Stan and Kyle free him, so the government hires Steve Irwin (from "Crocodile Hunter") to track him down.
Full Recap
After watching The Crocodile Hunter the boys decide to go searching for crocodiles. Kyle trips on a stone and slides down a hill and falls into a hole. At the bottom of the hole, Kyle finds he is in a cave. When Stan comes down to rescue him he discovers a prehistoric iceman. Kyle and Stan speculate on what kind of reward they might get for finding the icemen. Somehow, the 4 boys manage to get a man encased in a block of ice out of the hole. Stan decides that iceman's name should be “Gorak” and Kyle thinks it should be “Steve.” And so Stan and Kyle begin their fight over who should get the credit for finding the iceman. The town is debating capital punishment, when the boys arrive with the icemen. Dr. Mephisto arrives on the scene and agrees to thaw the iceman. He can't reward the boys, but lets them give the iceman a name. Kyle quickly yells out “Steve.” Dr. Mephisto starts thawing the iceman and determines that given his clothing, he must be from 1996. Reporters arrive on the scene and Kyle has been given credit for the discovery, much to the chagrin of Stan. Dr. Mephisto is ready to do the autopsy when they realize that the iceman is still alive. Dr. Mephisto (oblivious to the fact that “Steve” is speaking perfectly good English) seeks out a way to communicate with the thawed iceman. He decides the simple mind of a child will do the trick, so he requests that Officer Barbrady bring one of boys to help. All the boys arrive at the lab, where Stan easily communicates with “Steve.” Then “Steve” freaks out when he finds out that he has been frozen for 32 months. Dr. Mephisto gives him a sedative. Kyle blames Stan for causing the freak out and they begin to fight, each claiming to the other that Cartman is now his best friend.
Some men arrive and offer to help Dr. Mephisto with his experiments with the iceman. Dr. Mephisto shows them the habit that he and Kevin have setup for the iceman, which duplicates the environment of 1996. The men help Dr. Mephisto raise funds for his experiments by putting the iceman on display. The boys object to the iceman being put on display. Later that night, Stan comes to bust "Gorak" out and Kyle also arrives on the scene with plans to rescue "Steve." Stan and Kyle begin fighting over who is going to do the rescuing; when Stan opens for the door for the iceman whose real name is Larry. Larry leaves the lab while the boys are in the midst of their fight, which ends with them planning to fight at the bus stop the following afternoon. Meanwhile, Larry is out wandering the streets of South Park. Dr. Mephisto and the men discover the iceman's escape and wonder where he might have gone off to. The men realize they will need "special assistance" to find the iceman. Larry arrives at the door of his home and when his wife answers, she doesn't recognize him. She introduces him to current lover and tells him the story of their attempt to rescue him. Larry is dejected and decides that he might as well refreeze himself. Stan is talking to him as he is doing this, when Kyle arrives on the scene, with some information for "Steve." Kyle shows him a brochure for Des Moines, a place that is two years behind the time, just like Larry. Both Kyle and Stan plan to get the iceman to Des Moines and escape just as Dr. Mephisto and the men arrive on the scene. They've brought their specialist with them, The "Crocodile Hunter," who claims he can track anything.
Stan and Kyle try to buy Larry a one-way train ticket to Des Moines. The boys pause for a moment to start their fight. The “Crocodile Hunter” is one the trail of iceman, when he gets distracted by the Rocky Mountain rattler. Larry gets his train ticket and thanks Stan and Kyle for their help, telling them what he's learned about friendship, as Stan and Kyle continue to beat the crap out of each other. The train leaves the station as Dr. Mephisto, the men and the Crocodile Hunter arrives at the scene. They all go in pursuit of the train and catch up to it. The Crocodile Hunter manages to corner Larry and gets his thumb in Larry's butt hole. The men, with aid of a helicopter manage to stop the train. The blades from the helicopter manage to dice and slice the Crocodile Hunter quite nicely. Dr. Mephisto and the men search for Larry, who manages to steal the helicopter and escape to Des Moines. The men, who it turns out, were from the government; have to give up on their plans to use the iceman in their plot against Sweden. Kyle and Stan agree to become best friends again as "Crocodile Hunter" Cartman attempts to stick his thumb in the butt hole of a cow.
Kenny dies when he pulled underneath the conveyor used for the tourists in the iceman display. As they are in the midst of their fight when this happens, when Stan says his catchphrase "Oh my God, they killed Kenny…," he waits for Kyle's standard response, which doesn't come. Kyle looks at him and says "What? I'm not talking to you."
Saturday, May 23, 2009
results are still hazy 2.rah.000746 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire While research is being published at a rapid rate (more than 50 breath-related papers so far in 2008), scientists are still figuring out which breath-bound molecules are most meaningful and what collection methods work best.
“It’s unclear what we should be looking for in there—there’s stuff from A to Z,” says Rohit Katial, director of the allergy and immunology program at the National Jewish Medical and Research Center in Denver. Breath is “an intriguing source of a bodily sample,” he says. “But it is still in its infancy—the detection techniques just aren’t there yet.”
Although the results are still hazy in some areas of research, breath analysis is a reliable non-invasive means of detecting certain ills, such as lung inflammation, says John Hunt, a respiratory medicine specialist at the University of Virginia Children’s Hospital in Charlottesville. Breath from a normal airway is mildly alkaline, about pH 8, but someone with acute respiratory disease might have a breath pH of 3. “Kind of like putting lemonade in your eye,” says Hunt.
An airway making this much acid can be an early sign of pulmonary disease or lung transplant rejection, says Hunt, who cofounded a company that makes equipment for collecting breath condensate. And severe asthma—a suite of symptoms, not a disease—may be triggered by a number of cellular irritants, from viral infections to exposure to diesel emissions. Analyzing breath condensate can help discern whether acid reflux is causing irritation or contributing to it, helping doctors target drugs more effectively, says Hunt.
“It’s unclear what we should be looking for in there—there’s stuff from A to Z,” says Rohit Katial, director of the allergy and immunology program at the National Jewish Medical and Research Center in Denver. Breath is “an intriguing source of a bodily sample,” he says. “But it is still in its infancy—the detection techniques just aren’t there yet.”
Although the results are still hazy in some areas of research, breath analysis is a reliable non-invasive means of detecting certain ills, such as lung inflammation, says John Hunt, a respiratory medicine specialist at the University of Virginia Children’s Hospital in Charlottesville. Breath from a normal airway is mildly alkaline, about pH 8, but someone with acute respiratory disease might have a breath pH of 3. “Kind of like putting lemonade in your eye,” says Hunt.
An airway making this much acid can be an early sign of pulmonary disease or lung transplant rejection, says Hunt, who cofounded a company that makes equipment for collecting breath condensate. And severe asthma—a suite of symptoms, not a disease—may be triggered by a number of cellular irritants, from viral infections to exposure to diesel emissions. Analyzing breath condensate can help discern whether acid reflux is causing irritation or contributing to it, helping doctors target drugs more effectively, says Hunt.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
inhibitor 5.inh.0098 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
A new HIV drug can, when combined with other therapies, suppress even the most drug-resistant strains of the virus that causes AIDS, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire scientists report in two papers in the July 24 New England Journal of Medicine.
The study looks at one group of HIV patients for whom the standard, clinically approved HIV medications are not working.
“These people are very sick, and they have few if any other treatment options because they have a form of HIV that is resistant to just about any clinically approved medication,” says study coauthor Jeffrey L. Lennox, who directs the HIV/AIDS care clinic at Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta. “Without this new drug, some of the patients might not be with us today.”
When combined with other anti-HIV medications, the drug, raltegravir, was an effective treatment for patients in the study, Lennox says.
The MERCK drug is the first in a novel class of antiretroviral drugs called integrase inhibitors, which disrupt the virus’s ability to integrate its DNA into uninfected cells. If the virus cannot infect healthy cells with its genetic material, the virus cannot replicate and continue to spread throughout the body.
“I was impressed with how potent raltegravir proved to be for a group of patients that are hardest to treat,” says Steven Johnson, chief of the University of Colorado Denver’s HIV clinic in Aurora, who was not involved in the new studies.
The study led to FDA approval of raltegravir last year, Lennox notes. As with many clinical trials, the FDA reviewed the studies’ unpublished data after patients had been taking raltegravir in combination with other drugs for 24 weeks. Researchers measured patients’ levels of HIV in the blood, and patients taking raltegravir showed a significant reduction in their virus levels compared with those taking a placebo in combination with other antiretroviral drugs. Because of the promise raltegravir showed, early in the studies, the administration fast-tracked the HIV-suppressor for clinical use in October of 2007, Lennox says.
“These newly reported data out to week 48 confirm the 24-week results that led to regulatory approval for clinical use,” says MERCK scientist Bach-Yen Nguyen.
In order to participate, patients needed to have more than 1,000 copies of HIV-1 RNA per milliliter of blood while receiving antiretroviral therapy. After 48 weeks, 62.1 percent of raltegravir recipients had HIV-1 RNA levels below 50 copies per milliliter of blood compared with 32.9 percent in the placebo group.
While the first paper reports on the efficacy and safety of raltegravir, the second looks at the virus’s ability to grow resistant to the new drug.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Some study patients became resistant even to the new drug, especially when it was used without other anti-HIV medications. Johnson says the finding reinforces the practice of treating HIV with a combination of medications.
The researchers also report that the group taking the new drug had slightly higher rates of cancer than the control group. Cancers were detected in 3.5 percent of patients taking raltegravir, while 1.7 percent of placebo-taking participants showed cancer growths. Longer term studies are needed to watch for these problems, Johnson says, but “the benefits likely outweigh the risks.”
The study looks at one group of HIV patients for whom the standard, clinically approved HIV medications are not working.
“These people are very sick, and they have few if any other treatment options because they have a form of HIV that is resistant to just about any clinically approved medication,” says study coauthor Jeffrey L. Lennox, who directs the HIV/AIDS care clinic at Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta. “Without this new drug, some of the patients might not be with us today.”
When combined with other anti-HIV medications, the drug, raltegravir, was an effective treatment for patients in the study, Lennox says.
The MERCK drug is the first in a novel class of antiretroviral drugs called integrase inhibitors, which disrupt the virus’s ability to integrate its DNA into uninfected cells. If the virus cannot infect healthy cells with its genetic material, the virus cannot replicate and continue to spread throughout the body.
“I was impressed with how potent raltegravir proved to be for a group of patients that are hardest to treat,” says Steven Johnson, chief of the University of Colorado Denver’s HIV clinic in Aurora, who was not involved in the new studies.
The study led to FDA approval of raltegravir last year, Lennox notes. As with many clinical trials, the FDA reviewed the studies’ unpublished data after patients had been taking raltegravir in combination with other drugs for 24 weeks. Researchers measured patients’ levels of HIV in the blood, and patients taking raltegravir showed a significant reduction in their virus levels compared with those taking a placebo in combination with other antiretroviral drugs. Because of the promise raltegravir showed, early in the studies, the administration fast-tracked the HIV-suppressor for clinical use in October of 2007, Lennox says.
“These newly reported data out to week 48 confirm the 24-week results that led to regulatory approval for clinical use,” says MERCK scientist Bach-Yen Nguyen.
In order to participate, patients needed to have more than 1,000 copies of HIV-1 RNA per milliliter of blood while receiving antiretroviral therapy. After 48 weeks, 62.1 percent of raltegravir recipients had HIV-1 RNA levels below 50 copies per milliliter of blood compared with 32.9 percent in the placebo group.
While the first paper reports on the efficacy and safety of raltegravir, the second looks at the virus’s ability to grow resistant to the new drug.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Some study patients became resistant even to the new drug, especially when it was used without other anti-HIV medications. Johnson says the finding reinforces the practice of treating HIV with a combination of medications.
The researchers also report that the group taking the new drug had slightly higher rates of cancer than the control group. Cancers were detected in 3.5 percent of patients taking raltegravir, while 1.7 percent of placebo-taking participants showed cancer growths. Longer term studies are needed to watch for these problems, Johnson says, but “the benefits likely outweigh the risks.”
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